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Abstract 
 
This is an additional contribution to the large body of literature developed in the area of economics of 
skilled labor migration. It focuses on two major objectives that are the determinants of the migration and 
its likely impacts on developing economies. Within the framework of the new economics of skilled labor 
migration, this research has attempted to test empirically the relevance of some components of the most 
recent new economic models of skilled labor migration. Using available data from international 
organizations (World Bank, OECD, UNESCO…) and others, in both regressions analyzes and economic 
simulations, hypotheses have been tested and directions of empirical results identified for larger policy 
discussions. The theoretical models that have been given priority in these empirical investigations are 
mainly those of Beine & al, Stark (2005) & al, N. Duc Thanh (2004) and M. Schiff (2005). A major focus has 
been placed on the models suggested by Duc Thanh (2004) where useful specifications of the functional 
forms were made. This selected framework uses the similarities that have been observed between this 
model and that of Stark and Schiff. 
 
The empirical results that have been obtained confirm the role of relative wages, the availability of better 
opportunities such as jobs, the importance of the living conditions as well as the existence of more 
attractive working conditions in destination countries relative to source economies. Concerning the 
estimation of the impacts of skilled labor migrations for both developed and developing economies, the 
specifications have followed Beine, Stark and Duc Thanh models with special emphasis placed on this 
latter. Given the dynamic nature of Beine’s model and with the limits on the available time series, 
significant empirical results are obtained and tests of Beine’s propositions achieved. The regressions 
results using the subcomponent of the knowledge economic index have shown significantly the effects of 
both domestic education and the attractiveness of foreign relative wages as major determinants that 
support the explanation of the level of knowledge added by the tertiary sector in each economy. In the 
sense of these estimations, it appears clearly that any economy is under two major opposite effects. On 
one hand, there is the relative share of investment in education that affects positively the human capital 
formation in any country but with higher impact in developing economies. On the other hand, there is the 
magnitude of the relative wages that negatively affect the performance of developing economies as 
measured by the subcomponent of the knowledge economic index. These results have been first 
confirmed through regression analysis.  
 
These preliminary findings suggest that local, national, regional and international economic policies 
consider the new theoretical and empirical trends shown so far by these results.  
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Introduction 
 
This paper looks at the determinants and impacts of the migration of skilled labor from 
developing (South) to developed economies (North). In the absence of cross-section data 
about individual and group choices, only aggregate secondary and incomplete data can be 
used to understand and assess the overall determinants and impacts of the migration of skilled 
labor. The available publications related to the migration of skilled labor with its relationship 
to economic and social development show the diversity and richness of the material 
developed so far. The accumulated knowledge focuses on the perception and loss of 
qualification at the source of emigration with emphasis on the potential gains transferred to 
destinations. It also insists on the perceptions related to the educational and training costs 
invested at the origin and to the experience accumulated by the emigrant, mainly when public 
budgets and expenditures are involved. The overall direct and indirect benefits and costs that 
are related to the processes of emigration of skilled labor have also constituted important 
components in the economic literature. Finally, it can be derived from the accumulated 
knowledge that the higher intensity of emigration of skilled labor from the same given sources 
has shown a large body of reports and publications indicating the directions of losses and 
gains between developing and developed economies especially in the era of globalization and 
increased competitiveness and where knowledge is the most important driver (Driouchi & al, 
2006). 
This paper starts with a comprehensive literature review about the determinants and the 
impacts of the migration of skilled labor. This is followed by a description of the methods and 
data used to assess both the determinants and the impacts using some selected models. The 
results obtained are then submitted before tackling their discussion with the implied economic 
policy issues.  
 
 
I. Literature Review 
Different approaches to migration have been identified and different assessments have been 
developed. These approaches are mainly based on the relationship between developing and 
developed countries with the possibilities of enhancing the likely benefits that can be obtained 
from this migration. In relation to that, some authors have considered the brain drain to be 
negative to developing economies while others have been more in favor of negotiated 
solutions as gains are observed to occur to source countries. This latter literature is now 
progressively shaping international and national policies.  
 
1. Determinants of skilled workers’ migration 
The large body of reports developed by the International Labor Office has been useful in 
understanding series of economic, social and policy issues related to human migration in 
general and to skilled labor in particular. Report 44 by Lindsay Lowell and Allan Findlay 
(2002) underlines the absence of databases that directly deal with high skilled labor migration. 
Report 73 by Gloria Moreno-Fontes Chammartin & Fernando Cantù-Bazaldùa (2005) has set 
some prospects for migration in the context of the enlargement of the European Union. The 
prospect for skilled labor migration is high as workers are supposed to settle where their 
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productivity and wages are higher. The factors behind this high prospect include income gaps, 
the social and the network systems and the attractiveness of the educational system in Europe. 
The existing literature recognizes that the “brain drain” is another aspect of international 
mobility that worries researchers and political leaders, from the North and the South, and 
emphasizes the idea of cooperation between labor transmitting and labor receiving countries. 
 
 
2. Effects of Brain Drain on the welfare and growth of source countries 
 
The work concerning the international emigration of skilled labor force, considered as talent 
drain from the least developed economies towards the most developed, had rather 
unanimously advanced following the idea that brain drain is unfavorable to the development 
of the source economy (Bhagwati & Hamada, 1974). The principal arguments justifying this 
situation are related to different types of externalities, induced by the migration of human 
capital, which are imposed on the remaining population. Bhagwati and Hamada (1974, 1982) 
show that the emigration of the most skilled labor force generates a tax externality associated 
with a distortion of the optimal tax system on two levels. On the one hand, knowing that the 
most skilled agents are better remunerated, government loses in terms of tax income due to its 
agents’ drain, which affects the potential size of revenue redistribution. In the same way, the 
investment in terms of education and training represents major costs for developing countries 
which cannot receive benefits in return since the migration of skilled labor takes place.  
Bhagwati and Dellalfar (1973) proposed a tax on professional emigrants’ income for an 
approximate period of their ten first years in the host country. This tax is supposed to be 
collected by UNDP and distributed in the countries of origin. However, there are 
administrative problems associated with tax collection, the problem of non-benevolent 
developing governments, and the extent to which a brain drain tax should be integrated in the 
tax system of the country of origin. To avoid these problems, a small tax on the incomes of 
citizens living abroad was considered as a possible approach in collecting a brain drain tax 
(Wilson, 2005). 
Bhagwati and Partington (1976) and Bhagwati (1976) discuss the feasibility of the tax on 
residents’ income in the host country. This tax cannot be gathered by all developed countries 
(different political systems and constitutions) but might be collected by developing countries 
through a multilateral treaty. Maynard (1976) criticized the depth of analysis of Bhagwati and 
co-authors regarding the definition of developed and developing countries, the definition of 
equity in terms of distributing resources, the compensation principle (10% tax for 10 years), 
the over production of professional and technical personnel by underdeveloped economies, 
and the efficiency of the international redistributive mechanism (free riders, efficient use of 
funds). 
The effect of asymmetric information was introduced by Kwok and Leland and commented 
by Katz and Stark. Asymmetric information in labor market according to Kwok and Leland is 
the reason behind the brain drain in less developed countries. Since employers abroad are 
better informed about workers’ productivity than domestically, they offer better wages 
making skilled employees prefer to stay abroad. However, under alternative scenarios of 
asymmetric information, less skilled workers migrate from less developed countries more 
than highly skilled labor. Depending on which side the information is present (rich or poorer 
country), asymmetric information tend to encourage migration. From the side of a poorer 
country (ex. Taiwan), the asymmetric information may support low-skilled workers’ 
migration. From the rich country side (ex. USA), asymmetric information might cause the 
migration of highly skilled workers (Katz & Stark, 1984).  
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In their reply to this, Kwok and Leland found that the example of Katz and Stark is another 
result of their research: skilled workers will stay in their home country while less skilled 
workers might migrate, if reverse information asymmetries exist (if the poorer country can 
better screen its workers than the rich one). When sufficient wage differential is available, 
emigration of the least talented workers can occur but will often be partial. Migration and 
government policies affecting mobility can then be discussed in relation to informational 
asymmetries and relative wages (Kwok & Leland, 1984). 
Blandy (1968) constructed a model through which he assessed the brain drain phenomenon. 
He found out that migration is multidirectional (not only into North America) and is a 
complex movement attached to political, economic and educational development processes. 
Two conditions should hold to conclude that brain drain exists. The first condition is when the 
migration of highly skilled workers is growing more rapidly than the number of highly skilled 
labor in the home country. The second is when the difference between these rates of increase 
is greater than the difference between the rates of increase of migration as a whole and the 
economically active population as a whole. 
According to the endogenous growth theory, the migration of competencies imposes an 
externality whose origin lies in the reduction of local human capital stock available for 
present and future generations. This implies a negative effect on the income of workers who 
didn’t emigrate or on the growth rate of the source country. Moreover, qualified work is an 
instrumental factor in attracting foreign investments (Fujita et al. 1999) as well as in the 
capacity of assimilation and absorption of technological externalities or for the success of 
foreign technologies adoption (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994). 
Furthermore, within the framework of the new theory of endogenous growth, the human 
capital drain is unfavorable to development (Miyagiwa, 1991; Haque and Kim, 1995) since 
the loss in human capital resulting from skilled workers emigration decreases productivity and 
income per-capita. Miyagiwa (1991) for example, shows that in the presence of increasing 
outputs from education, the emigration of very skilled workers can decrease the income of 
workers with intermediate skills either these latter migrate or not. Under certain conditions, 
this author shows that the national income of the source country can be lower than the one 
that would prevail in the absence of migration. Thus, the brain drain was identified as a 
serious problem against which policies had to and could act. Haque and Kim (1995) think that 
education policy is the answer. Since educated people are more likely to emigrate, in an open 
economy, then education should focus en primary and secondary levels. Even though 
remittances counterbalance the effects of brain drain, Haque and Kim (1995) found that these 
remittances have a negative effect on the growth of the home country.  
Using the simple economic model of labor demand and supply, Mishra (2006) assessed the 
quantity of welfare loss that results from labor movement both when external effects do not 
exist and when they do. When external effects of labor migration are not taken into 
consideration, the emigration loss is the surplus resulting from the difference between the cost 
of employing the workers who migrate and the value of their marginal product. This welfare 
loss is due to the cost imposed on those who were left behind. Accounting for external effects, 
Mishra (2006) found that the loss from skilled labor migration is greater than without external 
effects.  
 
Very recently, the models and analyzes related to the negative impact of human capital 
migration, gave slowly the place to models and studies aiming at the identification of potential 
transmission channels through which the migration option as well as the possible money 
transfers could constitute a considerable source of income for the development process of the 
source country. 
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The new literature tries to show that potential net positive effects on human capital 
accumulation and growth that can be associated to human capital migration. Consequently, 
the unfavourable effect of the exodus of competencies can be reversed. Therefore, the 
expression “Brain Drain” becomes “Brain Gain”. In this new literature, it is suggested that the 
brain gain could be associated with the inciting impact created by the migration prospect on 
the size of human capital formation in an environment of uncertainty. According to 
Mountford (1997), the migration possibility even if temporary might enhance the average 
level of productivity of the source economy in a permanent way. The general idea is that, in 
poor economies, the net yield of human capital tends to be limited, thus inhibiting the 
incentives to invest in education and training. However, open economies offering migration 
possibilities make the human capital acquisition more attractive since wages of skilled 
workers are higher in developed countries. This can lead to an increase of the medium level of 
human capital in the remaining population according to Beine et al. (2002). In this new 
literature, in a context of uncertainty and heterogeneous individual aptitudes, two brain drain 
effects are highlighted: a natural incentive effect to the human capital formation, and a rather 
drain effect which appears with the effective departure of the economy’s talents. So, the 
human capital migration can be globally beneficial to the country of origin, when the first 
inciting effect dominates the drain effect by compensating for the negative direct impact of 
the brain drain on the human capital stock of the considered country.  
A survey of the empirical and theoretical literature, done by Docquier and Rapoport (2005), 
on skilled migration effects on developing countries stated that the level of development for a 
country is inversely related to its optimal rate of migration. Furthermore, education policy 
strengthens the possibility of a beneficial brain drain, given that education is partly publicly 
financed through education subsidies. The fiscal adjustments to the brain drain can lead to 
tradeoffs between efficiency and social justice. That is why Bhagwati’s tax can represent 
more benefits for the sending countries when investments in education are liquidity 
constrained (Docquier & Rapoport, 2005).  
Grubel and Scott (1966) already said that if the human capital migration is a social cost in the 
short run, it is possible that this cost can, under certain conditions, be largely compensated in 
the long run through the transfers’ potential, and the beneficial impacts emanating from the 
professional networks set abroad. There are two ways of carrying out the ‘brain gain’: either 
through the return of migrants to their country of origin (return option), or through their 
mobilization by associating them remotely to the development of their country of origin 
(network of experts’ option). The return option was successfully carried out in various newly 
industrialized countries such as Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Korea. The theoretical 
results of the new literature thus corroborate the argument of Grubel and Scott (1966), and 
suggest that the impact of emigration on the source countries could be rather positive. 
Consequently, in terms of economic policies, these works quite naturally encourage 
developing countries to open their borders, and to authorize migration in order to maximize its 
positive effects. 
Oded Stark also brought another perception of the brain drain. Since the familial and capitalist 
production functions are imperfect substitutes, migrant children might provide a positive role 
in the economy. An agricultural family that decides to move from “familial production” to 
“capitalist production” faces two constraints: “investment capital” constraint and risk 
constraint. The family tries to find solutions to the market imperfections it faces by driving 
the most suitable family member to rural-urban migration. This migration diminishes risks, 
given that the urban work is independent of agricultural production. Children are seen to yield 
different utilities: consumption, income, and status, security & insurance. However the role of 
the migrants is to cause technological change by increasing income. Education allows such 
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scenario, given that farmers use the educational system to prepare their children for migration. 
The total utility from children is increased when specialization by children in the different 
utilities production exist. A social-welfare implication arises given that private optimal 
behavior (family) doesn’t differ from the social optimal behavior (Stark, 1981). 
In his review of “The Migration of Labor”, Todaro (1991) emphasized Stark’s belief that 
migration is initiated by family decisions. Stark believes that migrants are driven by the wage 
differential, expected income and other factors and that migration is the result of incomplete 
and imperfect markets. Korner (1992), who has done the same review, presented Stark’s 
findings according to which, the individual-family cooperation and the markets’ mode of 
functioning are the causes of migration. This latter occurs when a group of people, determined 
to rationally allocate common resources, make economic decisions. So, migration is seen as a 
way to alleviate risks and is due to national and international market imperfections as well as 
institutional distortions. Stark also connects migration to information regimes, risks, 
remittances and economic performance of the migrants (Korner, 1992). In addition, Molho 
also identified from Stark’s “Migration of Labor” that many factors, such as highly imperfect 
markets in rural areas, credit access constraints, and risks and hazards, drive small farming 
families to send their most eligible member to urban areas or, in a more general sense, to 
migrate. The remittances sent by the migrant can alleviate risks related to new investments (in 
technology for farm production). Stark studied the role of relative depravation as well as that 
of information asymmetries when employers are faced with workers whose skills’ level is 
undetermined. Concerning the theme “Planning with migration”, Stark found out that 
government efforts to decrease labor movements were unsuccessful and that this phenomenon 
might be beneficial in a social framework. The economic performance of migrants depends on 
migrants’ characteristics, on informational asymmetries driving the migrant to take self-
employment risks and to save in case of return migration (Molho, 1992).  
Stark also identified the effect of one migrant altruistic relation with his family members or 
social group on his allocations and wellbeing and estimated the impact of the timing of 
intergenerational transfers of allocations on the recipients’ human capital formation. Stark 
found that the altruistic behavior of the migrant and his family can be driven from self-interest 
since the actual transfers of the migrant to his family might influence future transfers from his 
own children (Todaro, 1997). 
In another paper, Galor and Stark found that the probability of return migration affects 
migrant’s savings and economic performance. Compared with the native-born, migrants’ 
savings can decrease even with a small return probability (a decrease of the migrant’s wage). 
The model adopted by these two authors defines saving patterns between the migrants and the 
native-born. Therefore, the higher the probability of return migration, the higher is the level of 
savings. As a consequence of the possibility of return migration, migrants save more than the 
native-born. If return migration does not take place, migrants’ wealth outweighs the wealth of 
the native-born (Galor & Stark, 1990). This relationship between the possibility of return 
migration and the migrants’ saving behavior can explain the migrants/native-born 
performance: if return migration doesn’t occur, the migrants’ performance will be superior to 
the native-born one. Also, migrants with a positive probability of return will have higher 
mean incomes than the native-born, but if they decide to transfer some of their savings as 
remittances, the migrants/native-born differential will decrease. Migrants contribute more to 
capital formation in the source country compared with the native-born. That is why country 
policies should keep the return probability higher than 0 (Galor & Stark, 1990). 
Stark’s research considered the good results of a smart migration policy called ‘brain gain’. 
His theory resides in the fact that the prospect of migration may result in the formation of a 
socially desirable level of human capital. The expected higher returns to human capital in the 
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destination country influence the decisions about human capital skills’ acquisition in the 
source country. So, a well-structured migration facility can enhance the social level of human 
capital formed, either all individuals can migrate or only a group of them. Therefore, 
migration can result in a welfare gain for the non-migrants (Stark, 2005). 
The destination country has the power to form migration policies that maximize the natives’ 
welfare when migration control is expensive. Thus, the evaluation of the impact of migration 
on the home country showed that this country can still benefit from the prospect of migration. 
However, a more important welfare gain can be achieved if both the home and destination 
countries cooperate in establishing the migration policy. In terms of bilateral migration 
agreements, sharing the cost of migration control can improve welfare (Stark et al., 2005). 
However in spite of the theoretical premises of the present models, the robustness of the rare 
empirical studies that report the inciting effect of migration on the human capital formation 
still needs a final conclusion. Indeed, the only existing empirical studies about the bond 
between migration, investment in human capital and growth are those of Beine et al. (2002), 
and Faini (2002).  
According to Carrington and Detragiache (1999), it is widely known that a large number of 
scientists, engineers, physicians and other professionals from developing countries live and 
work in the United States, Canada and Western Europe. Besides, developing countries lack 
highly educated workers. This is what was called Brain Drain since the 1960s. Highly 
educated people (individuals with tertiary education) have the highest migration rates. 
However, in Central America and Mexico, the highest migration rates are those of individuals 
with secondary education. The large magnitude of brain drain from Iran, Korea, the 
Philippines and Taiwan shows that the movements of highly educated individuals in from 
developing countries can more be ignored. The data of the OECD continuous reporting 
system on migration was used to estimate the brain drain to OECD countries except USA but 
this data presents many problems. The reason behind so many skilled workers emigration 
from developing countries can be the differences in wage, quality of life, and education 
opportunities for children, job security and others. Another issue is the extent of education 
benefits for developing countries’ citizens that can control the brain drain (Carrington & 
Detragiache, 1999).  
Starting from a sample of 50 countries, Beine et al. (2002), who brought an innovation to the 
brain drain literature with their empirical results, show that the rate of emigration of the most 
skilled, positively and significantly influences human capital accumulation and growth. Most 
countries that are positively affected by the brain drain combine both low levels of human 
capital and low emigration rates for the highly educated. Negative growth countries appear in 
countries where 20% and up of the highly educated migrate and/or where up to 5% of the total 
population are highly educated. Both winner and looser countries exist, but the proportion of 
winners includes the largest countries in terms of demographic size (80% of the total 
population of the sample). Empirical studies showed that at an aggregate level, brain drain is 
not anymore seen as extractor of the most valuable human resources from poor countries, but 
needs a better understanding of the conditions and causes of negative brain drain. An 
extension for this research could include, in addition to education, remittances and business 
networks’ creation.  
However, Faini does not validate this result in his study. He didn’t find convincing proof 
about the bias that skilled migration in destination countries can benefit home economies, 
especially because of the globalization process that is harmful to poor countries. He also 
stated that a more liberal skilled migration policy can have an unfavorable effect on tertiary 
enrollment which contradicts the possible increase in the return to secondary education. Thus, 
return migration does not necessarily have an evident beneficial impact. Therefore, policy 
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makers are expected to strengthen multilateral trade systems and limit the repetition of 
financial crises in emerging economies (Faini, 2003).  
Schiff (2005) minimizes the size of the brain gain and its effect on growth and welfare 
compared with the new brain drain literature. The size is smaller because of heterogeneity, 
unskilled migration, uncertainty, brain waste and general equilibrium effects. The brain gain 
is smaller (or negative) with limited impact on welfare and growth. He shows that brain drain 
exceeds brain gain in constant state and agrees with contributors to the early brain drain 
literature, who viewed brain drain as a trigger of loss for the home country. The author agrees 
with the new brain drain literature on one point related to the most severe brain drain cases 
where the net brain gain is negative (Schiff, 2005). 
Even at the theoretical level, it seems that the literature on this subject is hesitant since the 
available models are specific enough to be able to show in a rather general way that the net 
impact of migration on the source country is always positive in term of human capital 
formation. In a series of papers, Stark et al. insist on the development of the migration 
prospect as a mechanism that can account for the externality associated with human capital. 
Within the theoretical framework of Lucas (1988), Stark et al. took over the idea of 
Mountford (1997) to show – using simple static models – that a well specified migratory 
policy can correct the human capital under investment in a decentralized balance, and ensure a 
well being gain for workers. The result according to which the stock of the national average 
human capital approaches the socially optimal level is not shown in their work although they 
analyse human capital externality and treat migration as a mechanism of internalization. 
According to Stark (2002), the decision to under-invest in costly human capital formation 
may be reached if an individual productivity is fostered by the average level of human capital 
in addition to his own human capital (in a closed economy), and thus affects social welfare. 
Migration can allow the formation of human capital at a socially desirable level. Besides, 
acquiring skills enhances the chances of having high skills rewarded. Grubel and Scott didn’t 
refer to the relationship between migration and welfare gain for the non-migrants even though 
they mentioned that emigration should be encouraged given that the emigrant improves his 
own income and that those who remain behind are not affected by the migrant’s departure 
(Stark, 2002). He also demonstrates both results of the prospect of migration: brain drain and 
brain gain and he found that a good migration policy can lead to welfare gain for all workers. 
The debate that turned over the advantages and costs of skilled migration resulted in many 
analyzes. It should be recognized that this kind of migration is costly in terms of the country 
of origin’s finances and economy.  
 
 
II. Methods of Investigation 
 
These methods are mainly those that helped assess respectively the determinants and the 
impacts of skilled labor migration. Besides the theoretical grounds on which each 
investigation has been conducted, the empirical models used are respectively based on 
regression analysis and simulations. The data are mainly aggregates from a diversity of 
sources. More details are provided below relative to both the determinants and the impacts of 
skilled labor migration. 
 
1. Factors that could explain the emigration of skilled labor 
The available reports and publications show that there are many factors that could explain the 
emigration of skilled labor to other destinations. The number of these factors is recognized to 
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have increased with globalization and with the development of competitiveness through 
knowledge and ownership of skills. The liberalization and openness of economies relative to 
the period of government intervention are also among the factors that contributed most to the 
enlargement of the set of likely explanatory variables that are behind emigration. In this 
context, subsets of current variables are provided in reports and publications.  
Relatively to the levels of variables in the source countries, the likely factors include the 
expected monetary gains, the living conditions, the working conditions, and the state of 
human rights, the accessibility to the emigration costs, and the accessibility to information, 
quicker promotion and acquisition of social status with easier access to networks and to 
professional support. Furthermore, the absence of jobs and decent occupations in the source 
country leads automatically skilled labor workers to search for opportunities elsewhere. 
Destination countries offering better opportunities are then selected for emigration.  
In this context, a first type of emigration of skilled labor is from developing economies to the 
developed ones. The second type is related to migration between developed economies. It is 
mainly the first type of emigration that is the focus of this report. The determination of the 
likely factors that have affected the emigration will be based on the above listing of factors, 
starting with labor market variables and ending with the inclusion of social and human rights 
variables. This determination is largely inspired by the report on global migrations (2005) that 
recognized that wages disparities, unemployment rates, differentials in life expectancy, 
education gaps and demographic gradients are among the major determinants of migration. 
 
2. Models used to assess impacts 
The models adopted in the measurement of skilled labor migration impact on source and 
destination countries, in terms of human capital formation and growth, are divided into 
theoretical and empirical studies.  
The model presented by Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2002) is an empirical assessment of 
the growth effects on home countries of skilled labor migration. Beine et al. used Carrington 
and Detragiache data (1998) concerning the emigration rates at three educational levels for a 
set of 50 developing countries. The results of this empirical study showed that brain drain can 
be beneficial as well as disadvantageous for the source countries. In addition, given that it is 
possible for brain drain to generate benefits for the source country, it is necessary to expand 
studies to means other than education.  
 
Table 1: Beine et al. Results “Brain Drain and LDCs’ Growth: Winners and Losers” 
Models Description and Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  then,  
 
 
 
 
Proposition 1 
The higher the personal ability of an individual, the lower is the cost of 
achieving the minimal education threshold, which also depends on other 
country-specific variables affecting human capital. 
The expected return to education is the weighted average of the relative 
return abroad and in the source country with m being the probability of 
skilled migration. 
 
The equilibrium proportion of educated agents in a country, where  is 
the ability of the worker indifferent as to whether to invest in education. 
Assumption: education investments in a given country can explain a higher 
initial level of human capital inherited by the following generation. The 
ex-post proportion of educated workers within the previous generation.  
 
The human capital growth rate equation shows two effects: the brain effect 
and the drain effect. 
The first term between brackets measures the negative effect and the 
second term measures positive (brain) effect. 
The ex-ante proportion of educated workers in the total population. 
 
These two equations are used to estimate the global effect of the brain 
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drain and evaluate the expected growth effect of a marginal increase in the 
migration probability. 
 
The evaluation of the closed economy stock of human capital. 
 
 
 
The growth effect of a marginal increase in the migration probability. 
 
 
This condition is necessary for a brain drain to be beneficial to the source 
country. 
 
The net growth effect of the brain drain. 
 
This condition is necessary for a marginal increase in the migration 
probability of the highly educated to be beneficial to the source country.  
 
Nguyen Duc Thanh (2004) continues with Beine et al. findings and presents a theoretical 
model including the heterogeneity of workers’ talents. Stark’s results move in the same 
direction as Duc Thanh’s: 
Table 2: The model of Oded Stark, Alessandra Casarico, Carlo Devillanova and Silke Uebelmesser 
Models Description and Analysis 
Open Economy 
 
   
 
 but   
 
Migration is assumed to have no cost of movement. The function of the 
expected net earnings of the workers in the sending country equals gross 
earnings given the probability of migration minus the costs of capital formation. 
The optimal level of individuals’ human capital when the possibility to migrate 
exists is . 
For any m between 0 and 1, the level of human capital in an open economy 
setting exceeds that of a closed economy setting, but it is below the level of 
human capital in the destination country. 
Table 3: Duc Thanh Results “Heterogeneous Talent and Optimal Emigration” (2004) 
 This model shows that the source country can experience a “brain drain trap”, meaning that 
emigration constraints always result in a net brain drain effect. An optimal emigration exists 
at a given probability after which the country starts to lose its human capital.  
Maurice Schiff (2005) presents other results focusing on the size of the brain gain that is 
smaller than the results presented in the other new brain drain literature, and thus the effect on 
growth and welfare are lower.  
Models Analysis 
 
 
 
 
Closed Economy:  
 
Open Economy: 
 
A Model of Optimal Emigration: 
and  
 
 
  
 
 
 
Since , then 
 
 
Proposition 1:  
If  
Proposition 2: 
If there exists a probability of  emigration at 
 
When pi > pi*: 
 
At pi**: 
A Model of Optimal Brain Drain: assumptions 
 
 
 
The accumulation of human capital stock depends on the human capital 
investment expenditure and talent (The human capital formation 
function). 
 
Workers’ life income.  
 
Human capital formation without emigration 
 
Human capital migration with emigration 
 
 
 
The worker objective function, when there is no chance to emigrate. 
 
 
The aggregate human capital formation of the economy without 
emigration. 
 
The expected income with chance of emigration 
 
 
The worker objective function, with emigration possibility. 
 
 
The aggregate human capital formation of the economy with emigration. 
If pi = 0, then HE = H0  
If pi = 1, then HE = 0 (definitely free emigration) 
 
ω is the number of times the income of the successfully emigrating 
worker is higher than the same worker working domestically. The human 
capital formation function was assumed as: 
 
 
The higher the probability of emigration pi, the less is the human capital 
accumulation: ‘Emigration Trap”. 
 
At pi*, the economy maximizes its domestic human capital stock: It is the 
optimal emigration probability. 
 
 
The net human capital gain will decrease. 
The total effect will be zero since the this probability of migration 
achieves H0 (no emigration) 
 
can be considered as a threshold in emigration constraint policy. 
 
 
Human capital formation without emigration.  
 
 
Human capital accumulation with brain drain. 
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Table 4: Maurice Schiff results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Models Description & Analysis 
Smaller Brain Gain: Partial equilibrium 
 
 
 
      
Where BG is the brain gain, BD is the brain drain (or numerical quotas to restrict 
entry) and S is the size of skilled population. 
 
Where E represents people acquiring education before migration became an option. 
When E>BD, skilled population increases over time (not a brain drain problem). The 
brain drain problem prevails when E<BD. 
If , then  
 
If , then 
 
 
 
The stock of educated people St increases at a decreasing rate until period j where ∆Sj 
= 0. The steady-state stock is St = S
P for all t ≥ j.  
 
St falls at a decreasing rate until period k where ∆Sk = 0. The steady-state stock is St= 
SN for all t ≥ k. 
 
In the steady state, the net brain gain is negative irrespective of the transition path. 
Heterogeneity: 
, , A**<A*<AMAX 
 > p since  
 
 
When S = p then  
ANM represents the average ability level of the individual who acquired education 
under no migration choice. AM is the average ability level of the individual who 
acquired education when migration became possible. 
p is the migration probability. 
AMIG is the average ability level of non-migrants from both the more able and the less 
able individuals. 
When the number of skilled individuals in the source country is the same whether 
migration takes place or not, migration results in a lower effective human capital 
stock. 
Unskilled Migration: 
When   then  
 
When p > 0 and q = 0, 
 
 
When p, q > 0,  
                                 
 
 
 
 
 
In the absence of migration, the education benefit or skill premium is B1 
p is the migration probability of skilled labor; q is that of unskilled labor. 
  
B2 is equal to the domestic skill premium plus the skilled labor migration premium 
multiplied by the skilled labor migration probability p. 
B3 is the domestic skill premium plus the skilled labor migration premium multiplied 
by the skilled labor migration probability p, minus the unskilled 
labor migration premium multiplied by the unskilled labor migration probability q. 
A brain drain increases the expected return to education by the expected migration 
benefit: a brain gain appears (new brain drain literature). 
When both skilled and unskilled labor can migrate, the expected return to education 
falls compared to the case where only the skilled can migrate: a smaller brain gain. 
Brain waste: 
 
 
 
B4 represents the expected benefit of education under skilled migration and brain 
waste (BW) conditions. 
In case i, there is no brain drain or brain gain. In case ii, where a brain drain takes 
place, the difference in benefits without brain waste and with brain waste is ∆BBW. 
This income loss implies a smaller brain gain. 
Uncertainty: 
 
 
 
Given that , under risk neutrality: 
 
Under risk aversion: 
 
 
 
 
The cost of education is C. The expected utility (EU) function represents risk 
aversion. The expected utility of education’s benefit is smaller than the utility of the 
expected benefit (smaller brain gain). 
 
Whether the expected utility from education with migration probability p is larger or 
smaller than that from education and not migrating is ambiguous. If it is smaller, there 
will be no brain drain, no brain gain and no brain drain problem. Once skilled 
migration is allowed by the destination country, risk aversion results either in a 
smaller brain-drain induced brain gain, or in zero migration and no brain gain. 
Negative brain gain 
 
 
 
 
The expected wage rate for unskilled labor 
The expected wage rate for skilled labor 
The return to education in the absence of migration: the migration option decreases 
the return to education (negative net brain gain or net brain loss). 
This result can be considered under less extreme forms of “brain waste”. 
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3. Description of the data used 
Different databases are used to assess the impact of skilled labor migration on the sending 
country as well on destinations. The indices of skilled labor migration are taken from the most 
recent OECD database. There are five indices used: The highly skilled expatriation rate 
according to Cohen and Soto database for the population of 15 and plus (EM1), the highly 
skilled expatriation rate according to Barro and Lee database for the population of 15 and plus 
(EM2), the average of EM1 and EM2 (EM3), the emigration rate by country of birth - total 
population (EM4), and the emigration rates by country of birth for the population of 15 and 
plus (EM5). As specified in the above database, the highly educated emigration rate from a 
country is obtained by dividing the highly educated expatriate population from the country of 
origin by the total highly educated native-born population of the same country (Highly 
educated native-born = emigrants + resident native born), knowing that the highly educated 
correspond to those with a tertiary level of education. 
Knowledge and socio-economic data are obtained from other databases and sources. The 
corruption perception index (CPI) is published by Transparency International. It is a 
composite index based on the corruption data in experts’ surveys. The Index of Economic 
Freedom (IEF) is available at the Heritage Foundation. It measures how much a country is 
economically free by assessing its trade policy, government fiscal burden, intervention of 
government in the economy, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investments, banking 
and finance, wages and prices, property rights, regulation and informal market activity 
(Heritage Foundation, 2006). The Knowledge Economy index (KEI) is obtained from the 
World Bank Institute. The KEI measures the degree of acquisition, creation, use and access to 
knowledge. It sums up indicators related to a country’s economic incentive regimes, its 
innovation ability, its education system, and its information infrastructures. The Gross 
Domestic Product Index (GDPI) is a measure of the per capita level of income resources 
accessed by all the individuals in a given country. It was computed by IEAPS by normalizing 
the per capita GDP data and serves as a reasonable indicator of a country’s wealth. The GDP 
is published in the Human Development Report 2005 by UNDP. The Human Development 
Index (HDI), also published by UNDP, measures the average achievements in a country in 
terms of a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living.  
Labor market variables including employment information are taken from the World Bank 
database, the index of tertiary education as a subcomponent of the education index included in 
the knowledge economic index is published by the World Bank Institute (2006). The 
investment per capita in higher education is measured by the expenditure per student devoted 
to tertiary education as percentage of GDP per capita (World Bank database, 2005). The 
relative wage in different immigration economies (ω) is measured by relative GDP per capita 
(World Bank database, 2005). International Monetary Fund (IMF) database was also used. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 16 
III. Empirical Results 
 
1. Assessment of the determinants of skilled labor migration 
The highly skilled expatriation rate according to Cohen and Soto database for the population 
of 15 and plus (EM1), the highly skilled expatriation rate according to Barro and Lee database 
for the population of 15 and plus (EM2), the average of EM1 and EM2 (EM3), the emigration 
rate by country of birth (total population) (EM4), and the emigration rates by country of birth 
for the population of 15 and plus (EM5). The first dependent variable here is EM3 the average 
of the two sets of data (EM1 and EM2). 
All countries in the sample show results that link positively KEI and HDI, IEF and GDPI but 
the second regression indicates negative correlation between IEF and CPI. These results are 
consistent with the definition and the scales of each of the indices used in these regressions. 
Regarding the emigration rates as measured respectively by EM1, EM2 and EM3, they appear 
in each regression to be negatively related to both IEF and KEI meaning that the increase 
(decrease) in IEF leads to less (more) emigration or that the openness of the economy implies 
more incentives to emigrate. At the same time, increases (decreases) in KEI imply less (more) 
emigration. But the emigration rate is under the double effects of KEI and IEF. Given the 
three other relationships, the emigration rate is statistically assumed to decrease (increase) 
with the increase (decrease) of the human development index and with the increase of the 
corruption perception index. These results may be interpreted as saying that emigration 
increases with low human development and with corruption. 
 
All countries in the sample  R² 
KEI = 2.03 + 1.99 (HDI)        
           37.86                19.06                            
                  0.80 
IEF  = 1.59 – 0.40 (CPI) 
           36.34              -13.18 
                  0.66 
HDI = -0.08 + 0.33 (GDPI) 
            -3.86                  18.34 
                  0.79 
EM1 = 4.71 – 1.25 (IEF) – 0.85 (KEI) 
             6.53               -2.4                   -4.79 
                  0.21 
 
All countries in the sample  R² 
KEI = 2.04 + 2 (HDI)        
           41.19         19.82                            
                  0.80 
IEF  = 1.63 – 0.43 (CPI) 
           43.03              -16.74 
                  0.75 
HDI = -0.08  + 0.33 (GDPI) 
             -3.54                   18.82 
                  0.79 
EM2 = 4.88 – 1.52 (IEF) – 0.91 (KEI) 
             6.03                -2.68                 -4.37 
                  0.17 
 
All countries in the sample  R² 
KEI = 2.04 + 1.99 HDI        
           42.33    21.54                            
                  0.81 
IEF  = 1.60 – 0.41 CPI 
           (41.04)  (-15.11) 
                  0.68 
HDI = -8.5*10-2  + 0.33 GDPI 
              ( -3.86)    (19.54) 
                  0.78 
EM3 = 4.18 – 1.13 IEF– 0.72 KEI 
            6.25    (-2.34)       (-4.27) 
                  0.15 
 
These results are better confirmed with the sample of developed economies for each of the dependent 
variables measuring emigration with stronger relationships between the emigration rates, IEF and KEI.  
 
Developed countries  R² 
KEI = 2.33 + 3.19 (HDI)        
           57.84                5.48                            
                  0.59 
IEF  = 1.60 – 0.43 (CPI) 
            6.61              -3.67 
                  0.39 
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HDI = 0.3 (GDPI) 
                        7.13 
                  0.71 
EM1 = 20.61 – 3.82 (IEF) – 7.57 (KEI) 
              3.56                -2.91                 -3.05 
                  0.37 
 
Developed countries  R² 
KEI = 2.37 + 3.93 (HDI)        
           96.45               13.01                            
                  0.87 
IEF  = 1.63 – 0.45 (CPI) 
            6.97               -3.93 
                  0.38 
HDI = 0.46 (GDPI) 
            7.41 
                  0.69 
EM2 = 7.51 – 2.57 (IEF)  
             2.42                -2.41               
                  0.20 
 
Developed countries R² 
KEI = 2.41 + 4.19 HDI 
         (57.56)  (13.66) 
0.85 
IEF = 1.77 – 0.51 CPI 
           (17.32)   ( -9.48) 
0.72 
HDI = 0.40 GDPI 
           25.14 
0.95 
EM3 = 7.98 – 2.46 (IEF) – 2.11 KEI 
             ( 5.6)    ( -3.41)   ( -4.34 )                  
0.37 
 
Similar directions are observed among developing countries but with weaker relationship 
between emigration rates and KEI.  
 
Developing countries  R² 
KEI = 1.77 + 1.64 (HDI)        
           23.22               12.67                            
                  0.70 
IEF  = 1.42 – 0.24 (CPI) 
           21.48              -4.19 
                  0.21 
HDI = -0.14  + 0.29 (GDPI) 
             -4.18                   12.97 
                  0.71 
EM1 = 5.12 – 1.69 (IEF) – 0.71 (KEI) 
             5.52                -2.3                   -3.6 
                  0.18 
 
Developing countries  R² 
KEI = 1.79 + 1.63 (HDI)        
           23.73               12.48                            
                  0.70 
IEF  = 1.51 – 0.31 (CPI) 
           29.37              -7.13 
                  0.43 
HDI = -0.15  + 0.30 (GDPI) 
             -4.53                   12.83 
                  0.71 
EM2 = 4.87 – 1.58 (IEF) – 0.79 (KEI) 
             4.28                -1.83                 -3.33 
                  0.14 
 
Developing countries R² 
KEI = 1.76 + 1.61 HDI        
          ( 23.21)   (13.29 )                           
                  0.71 
IEF  = 1.47 – 0.29 CPI 
          ( 25.70)   (-5.75) 
                  0.30 
HDI = -0.18  + 0.84 GDPI 
            (-5.10 )  ( 12.40) 
                  0.68 
EM3 = 3.88 – 0.56 KEI 
             (4.17 )  ( -2.62) 
                  0.09 
 
The overall results obtained show how economic (GDPI, IEF), social (HDI) and political 
variables (CPI) can explain the directions and magnitude of emigration from a given country. 
They clearly indicate that bad economic, social and political conditions explain the emigration 
as measured by the special two measures of skilled labor and their average.  
 
2. Other results 
Others results are based on the comparisons of the determinants of both the total emigration 
rate and that of skilled labor. The outcomes related to each of the dependent variables are 
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presented in the following table. These results confirm again the roles of the economic, social 
and political determinants as they have been shown in the first set of regressions.  
Throughout these estimations of new determinants of skilled labor migration, it can be said 
that the new indices for knowledge, corruption perception and openness of the economy have 
been useful in capturing important information that appears to be useful explaining the 
emigration rates and mainly those related to skilled labor. Besides, these results, the previous 
studies have shown that the incentives provided by destination countries with even special 
fiscal policies, are also important drivers of emigration. Furthermore, the factors related to 
distance, proximity, language and the existence of colonial or historical ties with destination 
countries are also important factors that can explained the pull of skills from developing 
economies. 
 
3. Impact assessment of skilled labor migration 
The literature on skilled migration and the implications on human capital formation and 
growth rate are almost exclusively theoretical. The studies of Beine et al. (2001 and 2003) are 
empirical evaluations of the growth effects of the brain drain for the source countries of 
migrants. This paper uses the results of Beine et al. and applies this model to a set of 64 
developing countries taking only the variables affecting human capital formation and growth 
rate.  
 
Hence, using the growth effect of a marginal increase in the migration probability and 
proposition 1, we continue with the estimation of the parameters from the two-equation 
system above. The estimation results are given in the following table.  
 
Econometric estimations of Beine & al Model  
Developing countries R² n 
Estimated 
equation: 
human 
capital 
1990 / 2000 1990 1990 1995 2000
(5.049) ( 3.259) (1.640)
0.269 ' 0.469 0.021HH d H m HDI ASEExp
−
∆ + = − +
m’=(1+m)/(0.65+m²) 
0.696 62 
Estimated 
equation: 
GDP 
growth 
2000
3
2000 2000
(4.679) ( 4.029)
5.011 1.692GDPgrowth hum hum
−
= −  
0.680 64 
 
Based on the conditions imposed by the theoretical model, the different values defined above 
are calculated and applied to the situation of each country. The corresponding results that 
allow the knowledge of the overall impact of emigration are introduced below for a sub-
sample of countries. More detailed list of results is presented in the appendix. Again, most of 
Beine’s & al results are confirmed and that brain gains take place for all developing countries 
but only few countries do not benefit from increased emigration. The models of Stark & al 
and of N. Duc Thanh will provide further detailed results.
  Cohen and Soto (2001)  Barro and Lee (2000) 
  
Highly 
skilled 
aged 
15+ 
Hi0 
(1-
Hi0) 
Deriv-
Psi 
Benef 
BD 
Net 
grwt. 
Effct. 
Benef 
Mg 
Inc   
Highly 
skilled 
aged 
15+ 
Hi0 
(1-
Hi0) 
Deriv-
Psi 
Benef 
BD 
Net 
grwt. 
Effct. 
Benef 
Mg 
Inc 
Brazil 0.017 0.242 1.456 Benef. 2.036 true  Brazil 0.012 0.242 1.481 Benef. 2.036 true 
Myanmar 0.017 0.243 1.456 Benef.     Thailand 0.014 0.230 1.471 Benef. 2.085 true 
Indonesia 0.019 0.198 1.446 Benef. 2.152 true  Indonesia 0.015 0.198 1.466 Benef. 2.152 true 
Thailand 0.019 0.230 1.446 Benef. 2.085 true  Paraguay 0.018 0.232 1.451 Benef. 2.125 true 
Bangladesh 0.02 0.238 1.441 Benef. 1.738 true  Argentina 0.018 0.230 1.451 Benef. 2.226 true 
Paraguay 0.02 0.232 1.441 Benef. 2.125 true  China 0.024 0.226 1.421 Benef. 2.218 true 
Nepal 0.021 0.233 1.436 Benef. 2.187 true  Myanmar 0.024 0.243 1.421 Benef.    
India 0.031 0.233 1.385 Benef. 2.657 true  Peru 0.027 0.247 1.406 Benef. 2.176 true 
Bolivia 0.031 0.250 1.385 Benef. 2.327 true  Nepal 0.029 0.233 1.396 Benef. 2.187 true 
China 0.032 0.226 1.380 Benef. 2.218 true  Bangladesh 0.03 0.238 1.390 Benef. 1.738 true 
Jordan 0.032 0.248 1.380 Benef. 2.495 true  Bolivia 0.031 0.250 1.385 Benef. 2.327 true 
Venezuela 0.033 0.239 1.375 Benef. 2.644 true  India 0.034 0.233 1.370 Benef. 2.657 true 
Costa Rica 0.04 0.250 1.339 Benef. 2.101 true  Egypt 0.034 0.242 1.370 Benef. 2.606 true 
Syria 0.043 0.232 1.323 Benef. 2.073 true  Venezuela 0.035 0.239 1.365 Benef. 2.644 true 
15 non-OECD 
countries with 
the highest 
percentage of 
highly skilled 
15+ expatriates 
in OECD 
countries Egypt 0.044 0.242 1.318 Benef. 2.606 true  Swaziland 0.035 0.249 1.365 Benef. 2.512 true 
                
Guyana 0.83 0.076 -0.948 Benef. 2.069 false  Guyana 0.769 0.076 -0.960 Benef. 2.069 false 
Jamaica 0.819 0.092 -0.951 Benef. 2.012 false  Jamaica 0.726 0.092 -0.959 Benef. 2.012 false 
Haiti 0.785 0.087 -0.958 Benef. 1.854 false  Guinea-Bissau 0.703 0.224 -0.955 Benef. 0.707 false 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.76 0.194 -0.961 Benef. 2.331 false  Haiti 0.68 0.087 -0.947 Benef. 1.854 false 
Fiji 0.619 0.227 -0.910 Benef. 2.020 false  
Trinidad and 
Tobago 0.661 0.194 -0.939 Benef. 2.331 false 
Angola 0.537 0.247 -0.809 Benef. 0.839 false  Mozambique 0.523 0.233 -0.785 Benef. 0.878 false 
Cyprus 0.533 0.243 -0.802 Benef.     Mauritius 0.501 0.247 -0.743 Benef. 1.407 false 
Mauritius 0.532 0.247 -0.801 Benef. 1.407 false  Barbados 0.471 0.247 -0.676 Benef. 2.032 false 
Mozambique 0.471 0.233 -0.676 Benef. 0.878 false  Fiji 0.429 0.227 -0.564 Benef. 2.020 false 
Ghana 0.451 0.249 -0.625 Benef. 2.065 false  Gambia 0.423 0.202 -0.546 Benef. 1.008 false 
United Rep. Of 
Tanzania 0.417 0.244 -0.527 Benef. 2.342 false  Congo 0.337 0.201 -0.236 Benef. 1.917 false 
Uganda 0.364 0.247 -0.344 Benef. 2.148 false  Sierra Leone 0.324 0.225 -0.181 Benef. 2.309 true 
Kenya 0.359 0.249 -0.325 Benef. 2.093 true  Ghana 0.312 0.249 -0.128 Benef. 2.065 true 
Burundi 0.343 0.250 -0.261 Benef. 2.335 false  Kenya 0.278 0.249 0.032 Benef. 2.093 true 
15 non-OECD 
countries with 
the lowest 
percentage of 
highly skilled 
15+ expatriates 
in OECD 
countries Sierra Leone 0.333 0.225 -0.219 Benef. 2.309 true  Cyprus 0.26 0.243 0.121 Benef.     
4. Tests using Stark’s and al, model 
 
The main task here is to test the relevance of Stark’s & al model through mainly the basic 
decision rule (equation 6 in the paper) that is
D
* ( )
1
S S
S m
k
β β β
ϑ
− +
= −% . The variables β
D 
and 
β
S
 are labor productivities considering the USA as a reference country (International Labor 
Organization, 2006) and k is relative education expenditures (Public spending on education as 
% of GDP) over the educational expenditures of the USA (World Bank Data, 2006). The 
variable
*S
ϑ% is the level of human capital calculated using Stark’s et al. model; KEI and 
KEIEducation are respectively the knowledge economic index and the index of education as a 
component of the knowledge economic index. 
 
Tests using Stark’s and al, Model 
Equations R² n 
2003 / 04
(4.862)
0.417KEI = ϑS*%
 
0.507 24 
2003 / 04
(4.652)
0.353KEI = ϑS*%
 
0.485 24 
2003 / 04
(4.983)
0.436KEIEducation = ϑS*%
 
0.519 24 
2003 / 04
(4.676)
0.366KEIEducation = ϑS*%
 
0.487 24 
2003 / 04
(15.827)
21.159 SKEI β=
 
0.916 24 
2003 / 04
(10.628)
4.743 DKEI β=
 
0.831 24 
 
These results show that the labor productivity in both developed and developing economies 
are related to the exogenous index of human capital as it is represented by KEI. This latter is 
also positively correlated with the calculated level of human capital using Stark’s decision 
rule (equation 6 in Stark’s & al, 2005).  
The following figures represent the optimal level of human capital (
*S
ϑ% ) given different 
probabilities of migration (m), when the countries of destination are, first, the northern 
countries and second, the Middle Eastern. The tables of estimation for those results, following 
Stark’s et al. model, are in the appendix. 
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5. N. Duc Thanh model (Heterogeneous talents and optimal emigration, 2004) 
 
The following figure reproduced from the paper by the author (page 9) shows how the 
consideration of heterogeneous skills lead to an overall human capital formation that varies 
with the levels of migration probabilities. The major conditions underlying this model are that 
relative wages in the destination and source countries are higher than one and that this wage 
ratio is higher than the inverse of the technical coefficient of the cost of education function 
(1/α)<ω). It shows also that when emigration is absent, the level Ho can be achieved. There 
are gains (brain gains) realized after reaching the level of migration pi* that maximizes the 
level of human capital. Above this latter probability value, losses start to occur in the source 
country. An equivalent level equal to Ho is attained (N) when emigration attains the value 
pi**. The level of capital is then definitely decreasing (brain drain) between pi** and 1.  
 
Source: Duc Thanh, Nguyen. Heterogeneous Talent and Optimal Emigration- A contribution to the new economics of the brain drain, Sept. 
2004, p: 9. 
 
In order to visualize the meaningfulness of this model, different simulations using different 
values for α, ω and pi are first considered. Based on the empirical data available mainly for ω 
and the migration rate, H/H0 is calculated for each developing country that is in the sample. 
The last step is to test for the existence of a relationship that could validate the N. Duc Thanh 
model. This is realized in two stages that are based on the introduction of the index of tertiary 
education enrollment as included in the knowledge economic index, Keied, (World Bank 
Institute, 2006), the investment per capita in higher education measured by the expenditure 
per student, tertiary as % of GDP per capita, c, (World Bank Database) and the ratio of 
country GDP, ω, which is equal to the ratio of GDP of the country of destination on the GDP 
of the source country (World Bank Database, 2005). This ratio is larger than 1 as required in 
the model. Stage 1 gives the results of the regression analyzes of the logarithm of Keied as a 
function of the logarithm of c and the logarithm of ω, while stage 2 represents the regressions 
of H/H0 on the logarithm of Keied. The results of both stages are presented in the following 
tables. The estimated equations for five destinations that are USA, EU, Canada, Australia and 
average are statistically are given by the regressions given below.  
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Destination 
Country 
Regressions DF R² 
Developing countries with 
Wage of USA 2003 / 04
(12.29) ( 3.81) ( 4.53)
ln( ) 3.64 0.35 ln( ) 0.34 ln( )Keied c ω− −
− −
=  24 0.80 
Developing countries with 
Wage of Canada  2003 / 04
(11.68) ( 3.76) ( 4.49)
ln( ) 3.48 0.35 ln( ) 0.33 ln( )Keied c ω− −
− −
=  
24 0.80 
Developing countries with 
Wage of Australia  2003 / 04
(11.53) ( 3.76) ( 4.49)
ln( ) 3.45 0.35 ln( ) 0.33 ln( )Keied c ω− −
− −
=  24 0.80 
Developing countries with 
Wage of EU  2003 / 04
(11.49) ( 3.60) ( 4.62)
ln( ) 3.43 0.34 ln( ) 0.35 ln( )Keied c ω− −
− −
=  24 0.81 
Developing countries with 
wage of Ave rage 
Destination Country 
2003 / 04
(11.78) ( 3.76) ( 4.49)
ln( ) 3.51 0.35 ln( ) 0.34 ln( )Keied c ω− −
− −
=  24 0.80 
 
The above results show how the subcomponent of KEI as a measure of human capital is 
explained by expenditures on education (measured as a share of GDP that is less than one) 
and the relative wage variable that is higher than one. It is worth to observe that the 
coefficient on ln (c) is positive while the one on ln (ω) is negative. This leads to considering 
that human capital formation in relation to skilled labor (tertiary education) is related to the 
cost of human capital formation and to the relative wages of destination countries relative to 
the source of emigration.  
 
Test using N. Duc Thanh model (selection of the best regressions) 
 
Equations α R² n 
0
2003 / 04
(5.723)
0.279
H
Keied
H
=
 
0.3 
 
0.373 56 
2003 / 04
0
(6.249)
0.268
H
Keied
H
=
 
0.28 0.415 56 
2003 / 04
0
(6.536)
0.487 ln( )
H
Keied
H
=
 
0.1 
 
0.437 56 
2003 / 04
0
(4.851)
0.505ln( )
H
Keied
H
=
 
0.2 0.3 56 
2003 / 04
0
(2.968)
0.503ln( )
H
Keied
H
=
 
0.3 0.14 56 
2003 / 04
0
(3.352)
0.507 ln( )
H
Keied
H
=
 
0.28 0.17 56 
 
Based on the above regressions (other regressions are in the appendix), it appears that the 
technical coefficient is around 0.28 and 0.3. With this remark an average scenario can be 
established for the set of sending countries included in the sample with the average 
destination. The following figure introduces the pattern of the human capital for every 
sending country. 
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T r e n d s  i n  H /H 0  g i v e n  d i f f e r e n t  
v a lu e s  o f  pi
0 . 0 0
0 . 5 0
1 . 0 0
1 . 5 0
2 . 0 0
2 . 5 0
3 . 0 0
3 . 5 0
4 . 0 0
0 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 5 0 . 1 0 . 2 5 0 . 5 0 . 6 0 . 7 0 . 8 0 . 9 1
pi
H
/H
0
A l g e r i a
A n g o l a
B a n g l a d e s h
B e n i n
B o l i v i a
B r a z i l
B u l g a r i a
B u r k i n a  F a s o
B u r u n d i
C a m e r o o n
C e n t r a l  A f r i c a n  R e p u b l i c
C h i l e
C h i n a
C o l o m b i a
C o s t a  R i c a
C ô t e  d ' I v o i r e
D o m i n i c a n  R e p u b l i c
E c u a d o r
E g y p t
E l  S a l v a d o r
E t h i o p i a
F i j i
G a b o n
G h a n a
G u a t e m a l a
G u y a n a
H o n d u r a s
H u n g a r y
In d i a
In d o n e s i a
I r a n
J a m a i c a
J o r d a n
K e n y a
M a d a g a s c a r
M a l a w i
M a l a y s i a
M a l i
M a u r i t i u s
M e x i c o
M o r o c c o
M o z a m b i q u e
N e p a l
N i c a r a g u a
N i g e r
N i g e r i a
P a n a m a
P a r a g u a y
P e r u
P h i l i p p i n e s
R o m a n i a
S e n e g a l
S i e r r a  L e o n e
S o u t h  A f r i c a
S u d a n
S y r i a
T a n z a n i a
T h a i l a n d
T r i n i d a d  a n d  T o b a g o
T u n i s i a
T u r k e y
U g a n d a
U r u g u a y
V e n e z u e l a
Z a m b i a
Z im b a b w e
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B e h a v io r  o f  H /H 0  g iv e n  d i f f e r e n t  v a lu e s  o f  α  
0 . 0 0
1 0 . 0 0
2 0 . 0 0
3 0 . 0 0
4 0 . 0 0
5 0 . 0 0
6 0 . 0 0
7 0 . 0 0
0 . 1 0 . 2 0 . 3 0 . 4 0 . 5
α
H
/H
0
A l g e r i a
A n g o l a
B a n g l a d e s h
B e n i n
B o l i v i a
B r a z i l
B u l g a r i a
B u r k i n a  F a s o
B u r u n d i
C a m e r o o n
C e n t r a l  A f r i c a n  R e p u b l i c
C h i l e
C h i n a
C o l o m b i a
C o s t a  R i c a
C ô t e  d ' Iv o i r e
D o m i n i c a n  R e p u b l i c
E c u a d o r
E g y p t
E l  S a l v a d o r
E t h i o p i a
F i j i
G a b o n
G h a n a
G u a t e m a l a
G u y a n a
H o n d u r a s
H u n g a r y
In d i a
In d o n e s i a
I r a n
J a m a i c a
J o r d a n
K e n y a
M a d a g a s c a r
M a l a w i
M a l a y s i a
M a l i
M a u r i t i u s
M e x i c o
M o r o c c o
M o z a m b i q u e
N e p a l
N i c a r a g u a
N i g e r
N i g e r i a
P a n a m a
P a r a g u a y
P e r u
P h i l i p p i n e s
R o m a n i a
S e n e g a l
S i e r r a  L e o n e
S o u t h  A f r i c a
S u d a n
S y r i a
T a n z a n i a
T h a i l a n d
T r i n i d a d  a n d  T o b a g o
T u n i s i a
T u r k e y
U g a n d a
U r u g u a y
V e n e z u e l a
Z a m b i a
Z im b a b w e
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These preliminary empirical results lead to considering the theoretical models suggested by 
Beine & al, Stark & al (2005) and Nguyen (2004). The latter models are based on the abilities 
and skills as the building block to the overall economic frameworks suggested. The second 
model has suggested a special specification that is based on the expenditures on education and 
heterogeneous talents. 
 
6. Sources of overestimation as in M.Schiff (2005) 
The sources of overestimation of brain gains exist as they originates from brain waste, 
negative brain gain, risk aversion behavior and general equilibrium effects. The brain waste 
occurs when the skilled emigrant occupies positions that require lower levels of skills 
implying that the person is undervalued both on wage and knowledge accumulation. The 
negative brain drain takes place when receiving countries prefer to employ lower skills or 
unskilled emigrants implying that the positive expected effects on education in the source 
countries become limited or negative. In case, the above models are considered to account for 
aversion to risks, the human capital accumulation of knowledge and the brain gains are 
reduced by at least by a fraction of the variance of gains in case of constant absolute aversion. 
Expenditures on education is the other component that can lower the overall gains because of 
the difficulties under the limited and same level of resources to increase the budget for 
education without affecting the other sectors.  
 
IV. Discussion of Results & Policy Implications 
 
The major results attained in this research relate to the determinants and impacts of skilled 
labor migration. The determinants appear to be those that have been largely described in the 
previous sources and documents. They all relate to the large differential in income, in living 
conditions, in access and use of knowledge, in freedom and transparency besides the 
availability of decent jobs and occupations. The implications are those that relate to a loss of 
flows of human skills but with lesser negative impacts on developing economies. These 
economies can still have access to remittances, foreign direct investments and other means 
that enhance the possibilities offered. Investment in education appears to exhibit promising 
positive effects if accompanied with larger access to local, national and international sources 
of knowledge. These processes are likely to generate new development opportunities that can 
be accelerated by the attraction of foreign investments, relocation of firms, promotion of new 
enterprises and then the expansion of the engine of growth. All these factors favor the 
attractiveness of the economy and accelerate the partial or permanent return of skilled labor. 
But, they are medium and long term issues that should be raised in relation to the 
intensification of emigration from South to North. The factors of intensification can be related 
to the larger negative impacts of climatic changes with their direct effects on economies that 
are mainly based on agriculture and natural resources with limited focus on industries and 
services. The impacts of such dependencies on natural resources can enlarge income 
differences and living conditions between developed and developing countries if the current 
trends were maintained. These enlarged differences can be major sources for the 
intensification of emigration to developed countries, starting with skilled labor. Bu, as it can 
be seen from the results above, there are short run types of niches that can create new 
conditions in the developing world. Developing economies still have possibilities of engaging 
in a new dynamics that can increase the benefits from migration if new measures are 
attempted and reforms accelerated in different areas that include mainly educational reforms, 
promotion of knowledge and the lack of generalization of access to both knowledge and 
education. 
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Conclusion 
 
It is expected that globalization and world development to be likely increasing the rates of 
emigration from developing (South) to developed economies (North) unless growth and 
prosperity take place in most countries of the South. Even under the optimistic scenario of 
further growth and development in the South, individuals and groups enjoy the freedom of 
mobility if they have larger opportunities to choose from. 
Within this context, skilled labor migration takes place and generates consequently higher 
benefits for individuals, groups and communities but also to both the source and destination 
countries. The benefits to the sending countries are monetary but also non monetary as they 
are expressed under direct and indirect benefits of emigration. Remittances are not the only 
benefits but knowledge and experience besides the direct impacts on the enhancement of 
education and research in the source country are major sources of gains. This type of 
emigration was considered to be a brain drain but the new economics on migration has 
identified that is a brain gain.  
The two objectives of this paper were to reveal the determinants of skilled labor migration and 
to assess empirically the impacts of this migration from the available and accessible data.  
The existing large literature on different dimensions of skilled labor migration has helped set 
a selection of the theoretical grounds needed for the empirical assessments. Some previous 
studies have also helped in the identification of the determinants. For the impact assessment, 
the models selected are within the generation of new economics of skilled labor migration. 
The models of Beine &al, Stark & al and Nguyen besides that of M. Schiff have been explicit 
both theoretically and possible databases identified for the empirical estimations. 
The results obtained have confirmed the relevance of series of variables that are related to 
economic, social and political dimension of the economies. Much of the time, these variables 
are represented as differences between the situation in developed and developing economies. 
Some of the recently established indices such as those related to knowledge, corruption 
perception and openness of the economy have been useful in the estimation of the 
determinants of skilled labor migration.  
Concerning the impacts, each of the above models in explaining the existence of brain gains 
throughout the sample of developing economies is retained. This brain gain is mainly 
represented as a stock of human capital that can vary depending on the emigration rate. It is 
also empirically related to the situation prevailing in the source economy. The newly 
established indices and mainly the knowledge economic index and some of its components 
have been instrumental in testing the relevance of the Stark & al and Nguyen models.  
The policy discussion implied by the above results includes both the promotion of 
development in each source country with emphasis on education, knowledge and freedom of 
access to these domains besides to emigration as a choice.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1: Estimates of the emigration rate (EM1) using GDP, HDI, KEI, CPI, EFI and other variables 
Variables Estimators R
2 
Significance Country 
group 
2 0 0 3 2 0 0 3
1 .1 4 2
1 .0 2 1
1
G D P H D I
EM e e=  
0.853 All coefficients are significant with a probability of 99% 
The model is validated with a probability of 99% 
All countries 
(90 countries) 
Dependent :EM1 
Independent : 
GDP2003, HDI2003 
 
2 00 3 20 03
1 .05 1
1 .762
1
GDP HD I
EM e e=  
0.869 All coefficients are significant with a probability of 99% 
The model is validated with a probability of 99% 
Developing 
countries (68 
countries) 
Dependent :EM1 
Independent : 
KEI2003, HDI2003 
 
2 0 0 3 2 0 0 3
0 .8 9 5 6 .7 7 2
1
K E I H D I
E M e e=  
0.827 The coefficients are not significant 
The model is validated with a probability of 99% 
Developed 
countries (22 
countries) 
2 0 0 4 2 0 0 3
5 .4 2 8
1 .3 5 8
1
C P I G D P
E M e e=  
0.813 All coefficients are significant with a probability of 99% 
The model is validated with a probability of 99% 
All countries 
(90 countries) 
2 0 0 4 2 0 0 3
1 .2 5 2
1 .9 2 1
1
C P I G D P
E M e e=  
0.816 The coefficient of CPI2004 is significant with a probability of 95% and the 
coefficient of GDP2003 is significant with a probability of 99%. 
The model is validated with a probability of 99% 
Developed 
countries (22 
countries) 
Dependent :EM1 
Independent : 
CPI2004, GDP2003 
2 0 0 4 2 0 0 3
5 .2 6 8
1 .5 6 6
1
C P I G D P
E M e e=  
0.815 All coefficients are significant with a probability of 99% 
The model is validated with a probability of 99% 
Developing 
countries (68 
countries) 
2003 2003 2003
0 .975
0 .843 0 .481
1
KEI GDP EFI
EM e e e=  
0.827 The coefficient of KEI2003 and GDP2003 are significant with a probability 
of 95% and the coefficient of EFI2003 is significant with a probability of 
99%. 
The model is validated with a probability of 99% 
All countries 
(80 countries) 
Dependent :EM1 
Independent : 
KEI2003, GDP2003, 
EFI2003 
2003 2003 2003
50.021
1.348 1.507
1
KEI GDP EFI
EM e e e
− −
=  
0.859 The coefficient of KEI2003 and EFI2003 are significant with a probability of 
95% and the coefficient of GDP2003 is not significant. 
The model is validated with a probability of 99% 
Developed 
countries (22 
countries) 
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Dependent :EM4 
Independent : 
EFI2003, HDI2003, 
KEI2003
 
4 2003 2003
2
2003
1.757 14.198
0.063
EM EFI HDI
KEI
= − +
−
 
0.485 The coefficients of EFI2003 and HDI are significant with a probability of 
99% and the coefficient of KEI2003
2 is significant with probability of 90%. 
The model is validated with a probability of 99% 
All countries 
(89 countries) 
 
4 2003 2003
2
2003
7.524 45.122
0.309
EM EFI HDI
KEI
= − +
−
 
0.711 The coefficients of EFI2003 and KEI2003
2 are significant with a probability 
of 95% and the coefficient of HDI2003 is significant with probability of 
99%.  
The model is validated with a probability of 99% 
Developed  
countries (24  
countries) 
2 2
4 2003 2003
2
2003
16.213 11.379
0.162
EM HDI GDP
EFI
= −
−
 
0.429 The coefficients of EFI2003
2 and GDP2003
2 are significant with a probability 
of 90% and the coefficient of HDI2003
2 is significant with probability of 
99%.  
The model is validated with a probability of 99% 
All countries 
(103  
countries) 
2 2
4 2003 2003
2
2003
16.314 10.193
0.552
EM HDI GDP
EFI
= −
−
 
0.635 The coefficients are not significant. 
The model is validated with a probability of 99% 
Developed  
countries (24  
countries) 
Dependent :EM4 
Independent : 
HDI2003, GDP2003, 
EFI2003
 
2 2
4 2003 2003
2
2003
12.715 2.868
0.152
EM HDI GDP
EFI
= −
−
 
0.397 The coefficients of EFI2003
2 and GDP2003
2 are not significant and the 
coefficient of HDI2003
2 is significant with probability of 95%.  
The model is validated with a probability of 99% 
Developing  
countries (79  
countries) 
2
4 2003 2004
2 2
2003 2003
0.109 2.31ln( )
10.735 0.307
EM KEI CPI
HDI EFI
= − +
+ −
 
0.491 The coefficients of EFI2003
2 and KEI2003
2 are significant with a probability 
of 95%, the coefficient of HDI2003
2 is significant with probability of 99% 
and the coefficient of ln(CPI2004) is significant with a probability of 90%.  
The model is validated with a probability of 99% 
All countries 
(89  
countries) 
2
4 2003 2004
2 2
2003 2003
0.383 3.164 ln( )
36.833 1.604
EM KEI CPI
HDI EFI
= − +
+ −
 
0.71 The coefficient of KEI2003
2 is significant with a probability of 95%, the 
coefficients of HDI2003
2 and EFI2003
2 are significant with probability of 
90% and the coefficient of ln(CPI2004) is not significant.  
The model is validated with a probability of 99% 
Developed  
countries (24  
countries) 
Dependent :EM4 
Independent : 
KEI2003, CPI2004, 
HDI2003, EFI2003 
2
4 2003 2004
2 2
2003 2003
0.012 1.834 ln( )
7.209 0.228
EM KEI CPI
HDI EFI
= − +
+ −
 
0.435 The coefficients of HDI2003
2 and EFI2003
2 are significant with probability 
of 90% and the coefficients of KEI2003
2 and ln(CPI2004) are not significant.  
The model is validated with a probability of 99% 
Developing  
countries (65  
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Table 2: Evaluation of the Beneficial Brain Drain Effect (Cohen and Soto, 2001) from the first 15 non OECD countries both with lowest and highest    
    Values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Developing 
country 
HDI 
1995 
HDI 
2000 
KEI 
1995 
ASE 
Exp. 
GDP 
gr. 
2000 
m 
(CS 
2001) 
humi 
2000 
humi 
1990 
Hi 
1990 
Hi 
2000 
Hi 
transf m' PSI 
PSI 
(m=0) Hi0 
Hi0 
(1-
Hi0) 
Deriv-
Psi 
Benef 
BD 
Net 
gr. 
Effc 
mi= 
EM5 
Hi(1-
Hi)/ 
(1-mi) 
Benef. 
M Inc 
Brazil 0.75 0.78 4.62 4.84 4.50 0.02 0.43 0.27 0.28 0.44 0.19 1.56 0.17 0.17 0.41 0.24 1.46 Benef. 2.04 0.44 0.44 true 
Myanmar      0.02      1.56 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.24 1.46 Benef.  0.19   
Indonesia 0.66 0.68 3.23 0.65 4.77 0.02 0.46 0.17 0.17 0.47 0.31 1.57 0.12 0.12 0.27 0.20 1.45 Benef. 2.15 0.21 0.31 true 
Thailand 0.75  4.96 3.45 4.31 0.02 0.45 0.24 0.25 0.45 0.23 1.57 0.14 0.14 0.36 0.23 1.45 Benef. 2.08 0.59 0.60 true 
Bangladesh 0.45 0.51 0.82 1.71 5.94 0.02 0.36 0.17 0.17 0.37 0.22 1.57 0.25 0.24 0.39 0.24 1.44 Benef. 1.74 0.35 0.36 true 
Paraguay 0.74 0.75 3.17 3.47 -0.30 0.02 0.46 0.25 0.25 0.47 0.24 1.57 0.15 0.14 0.37 0.23 1.44 Benef. 2.12 0.61 0.64 true 
Nepal 0.47 0.50 2.00 2.07 6.45 0.02 0.47 0.14 0.14 0.49 0.36 1.57 0.25 0.24 0.37 0.23 1.44 Benef. 2.19 0.18 0.31 true 
India 0.55 0.58 2.79 3.35 3.92 0.03 0.61 0.15 0.16 0.62 0.48 1.58 0.24 0.23 0.37 0.23 1.39 Benef. 2.66 0.28 0.33 true 
Bolivia 0.64 0.67 3.78 5.53 2.37 0.03 0.51 0.29 0.30 0.52 0.25 1.58 0.24 0.23 0.50 0.25 1.39 Benef. 2.33 1.44 -0.57 true 
China 0.68  2.85 2.03 7.94 0.03 0.48 0.23 0.23 0.49 0.28 1.59 0.15 0.14 0.34 0.23 1.38 Benef. 2.22 0.20 0.31 true 
Jordan 0.71 0.74 4.04 5.61 3.88 0.03 0.56 0.27 0.29 0.57 0.32 1.59 0.21 0.20 0.46 0.25 1.38 Benef. 2.50 2.05 -0.23 true 
Venezuela 0.77 0.77 4.78 5.01 3.21 0.03 0.60 0.25 0.26 0.61 0.37 1.59 0.17 0.16 0.39 0.24 1.38 Benef. 2.64 1.41 -0.58 true 
Costa Rica 0.81 0.83 5.88 5.07 1.66 0.04 0.45 0.38 0.40 0.47 0.11 1.60 0.16 0.14 0.50 0.25 1.34 Benef. 2.10 2.80 -0.14 true 
Syria 0.67 0.69 2.36 2.60 2.50 0.04 0.44 0.22 0.23 0.46 0.25 1.60 0.17 0.15 0.36 0.23 1.32 Benef. 2.07 1.30 -0.84 true 
Egypt 0.61  3.82 4.41 5.12 0.04 0.59 0.20 0.21 0.60 0.41 1.60 0.24 0.22 0.41 0.24 1.32 Benef. 2.61 0.72 0.85 true 
                       
Guyana 0.69 0.71  3.30 -0.70 0.83 0.44 0.32 0.84 0.88 0.12 1.37 0.12 0.16 0.92 0.08 -0.95 Benef. 2.07 36.48 0.00 false 
Jamaica 0.72 0.73 5.09 6.84 0.79 0.82 0.43 0.32 0.76 0.83 0.15 1.38 0.17 0.22 0.90 0.09 -0.95 Benef. 2.01 30.60 0.00 false 
Haiti 0.45  0.86 1.59 1.12 0.79 0.39 0.38 0.74 0.80 0.13 1.41 0.20 0.24 0.90 0.09 -0.96 Benef. 1.85 8.79 -0.02 false 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 0.79 0.80  3.44 4.78 0.76 0.51 0.33 0.69 0.83 0.21 1.43 0.09 0.12 0.74 0.19 -0.96 Benef. 2.33 22.13 -0.01 false 
Fiji 0.74   4.86 -7.99 0.62 0.43 0.28 0.54 0.67 0.18 1.57 0.18 0.17 0.65 0.23 -0.91 Benef. 2.02 17.81 -0.01 false 
Angola   0.32 4.40 2.12 0.54 0.17 0.05 0.05 0.23 0.19 1.64 0.53 0.51 0.55 0.25 -0.81 Benef. 0.84 2.85 -0.10 false 
Cyprus      0.53      1.64 0.44 0.41 0.41 0.24 -0.80 Benef.  19.28   
Mauritius 0.75 0.78 4.97 3.25 8.02 0.53 0.29 0.16 0.35 0.48 0.16 1.64 0.16 0.13 0.45 0.25 -0.80 Benef. 1.41 9.33 -0.03 false 
Mozambique 0.33 0.36 0.52 3.69 1.60 0.47 0.18 0.03 0.03 0.28 0.25 1.69 0.38 0.34 0.37 0.23 -0.68 Benef. 0.88 0.82 1.16 false 
Ghana 0.53 0.56 1.60 4.43 3.70 0.45 0.44 0.16 0.24 0.60 0.38 1.70 0.30 0.26 0.47 0.25 -0.63 Benef. 2.06 1.47 -0.51 false 
Tanzania 0.42 0.42 1.04 3.40 5.07 0.42 0.51 0.13 0.15 0.55 0.41 1.72 0.34 0.29 0.42 0.24 -0.53 Benef. 2.34 0.37 0.40 false 
Uganda 0.41 0.47 1.18 2.19 3.50 0.36 0.46 0.12 0.19 0.57 0.40 1.74 0.32 0.27 0.44 0.25 -0.34 Benef. 2.15 0.68 0.75 false 
Kenya 0.52 0.50 1.79 6.12 -0.24 0.36 0.45 0.12 0.20 0.57 0.39 1.74 0.35 0.30 0.47 0.25 -0.32 Benef. 2.09 1.13 -1.95 true 
Burundi 0.32   3.07 0.30 0.34 0.51 0.19 0.20 0.53 0.35 1.75 0.38 0.33 0.51 0.25 -0.26 Benef. 2.33 0.28 0.35 false 
Sierra Leone   1.09 1.07 6.96 0.33 0.50 0.18 0.25 0.68 0.46 1.75 0.49 0.44 0.66 0.22 -0.22 Benef. 2.31 1.42 -0.51 true 
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Table 3: Evaluation of the Beneficial Brain Drain Effect (Barro and Lee, 2000) from the first 15 non OECD countries both with lowest and highest    
   Values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Developing 
country 
HDI 
1995 
HDI 
2000 
KEI 
1995 
ASE 
Exp. 
GDP 
gr. 
2000 
m 
(BL 
2000) 
humi 
2000 
humi 
1990 
Hi 
1990 
Hi 
2000 
Hi 
transf m' PSI 
PSI 
(m=0) Hi0 
Hi0 
(1-
Hi0) 
Deriv-
Psi 
Benef 
BD 
Net 
gr. 
Effc 
mi= 
EM5 
Hi(1-
Hi)/ 
(1-mi) 
Benef. 
M Inc 
Brazil 0.75 0.78 4.62 4.84 4.50 0.01 0.43 0.27 0.28 0.44 0.19 1.56 0.17 0.17 0.41 0.24 1.48 Benef. 2.04 0.44 0.44 true 
Thailand 0.75  4.96 3.45 4.31 0.01 0.45 0.24 0.25 0.45 0.23 1.56 0.14 0.14 0.36 0.23 1.47 Benef. 2.08 0.59 0.60 true 
Indonesia 0.66 0.68 3.23 0.65 4.77 0.02 0.46 0.17 0.17 0.47 0.31 1.56 0.12 0.12 0.27 0.20 1.47 Benef. 2.15 0.21 0.31 true 
Paraguay 0.74 0.75 3.17 3.47 -0.30 0.02 0.46 0.25 0.25 0.47 0.24 1.57 0.15 0.14 0.37 0.23 1.45 Benef. 2.12 0.61 0.64 true 
Argentina 0.83 0.86 5.99 3.20 -0.52 0.02 0.48 0.29 0.30 0.49 0.22 1.57 0.10 0.09 0.36 0.23 1.45 Benef. 2.23 1.15 -1.65 true 
China 0.68  2.85 2.03 7.94 0.02 0.48 0.23 0.23 0.49 0.28 1.57 0.15 0.14 0.34 0.23 1.42 Benef. 2.22 0.20 0.31 true 
Myanmar      0.02      1.57 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.24 1.42 Benef.  0.19   
Peru 0.73  4.13 2.60 3.13 0.03 0.47 0.35 0.36 0.48 0.16 1.58 0.13 0.12 0.45 0.25 1.41 Benef. 2.18 2.31 -0.19 true 
Nepal 0.47 0.50 2.00 2.07 6.45 0.03 0.47 0.14 0.14 0.49 0.36 1.58 0.25 0.24 0.37 0.23 1.40 Benef. 2.19 0.18 0.31 true 
Bangladesh 0.45 0.51 0.82 1.71 5.94 0.03 0.36 0.17 0.17 0.37 0.22 1.58 0.25 0.24 0.39 0.24 1.39 Benef. 1.74 0.35 0.36 true 
Bolivia 0.64 0.67 3.78 5.53 2.37 0.03 0.51 0.29 0.30 0.52 0.25 1.58 0.24 0.23 0.50 0.25 1.39 Benef. 2.33 1.44 -0.57 true 
India 0.55 0.58 2.79 3.35 3.92 0.03 0.61 0.15 0.16 0.62 0.48 1.59 0.24 0.23 0.37 0.23 1.37 Benef. 2.66 0.28 0.33 true 
Egypt 0.61  3.82 4.41 5.12 0.03 0.59 0.20 0.21 0.60 0.41 1.59 0.23 0.22 0.41 0.24 1.37 Benef. 2.61 0.72 0.85 true 
Venezuela 0.77 0.77 4.78 5.01 3.21 0.04 0.60 0.25 0.26 0.61 0.37 1.59 0.17 0.16 0.39 0.24 1.36 Benef. 2.64 1.41 -0.58 true 
Swaziland 0.60 0.53 8.80 6.50 2.55 0.04 0.56 0.22 0.22 0.56 0.37 1.59 0.28 0.27 0.46 0.25 1.36 Benef. 2.51 0.34 0.37 true 
                       
Guyana 0.69 0.71  3.30 -0.70 0.77 0.44 0.32 0.84 0.88 0.12 1.43 0.13 0.16 0.92 0.08 -0.96 Benef. 2.07 36.48 0.00 false 
Jamaica 0.72 0.73 5.09 6.84 0.79 0.73 0.43 0.32 0.76 0.83 0.15 1.47 0.20 0.22 0.90 0.09 -0.96 Benef. 2.01 30.60 0.00 false 
Guinea-
Bissau 0.34 0.35  2.67 7.50 0.70 0.14 0.03 0.03 0.18 0.15 1.49 0.30 0.31 0.34 0.22 -0.95 Benef. 0.71 3.62 -0.06 false 
Haiti 0.45  0.86 1.59 1.12 0.68 0.39 0.38 0.74 0.80 0.13 1.51 0.23 0.24 0.90 0.09 -0.95 Benef. 1.85 8.79 -0.02 false 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 0.79 0.80  3.44 4.78 0.66 0.51 0.33 0.69 0.83 0.21 1.53 0.11 0.12 0.74 0.19 -0.94 Benef. 2.33 22.13 -0.01 false 
Mozambique 0.33 0.36 0.52 3.69 1.60 0.52 0.18 0.03 0.03 0.28 0.25 1.65 0.37 0.34 0.37 0.23 -0.78 Benef. 0.88 0.82 1.16 false 
Mauritius 0.75 0.78 4.97 3.25 8.02 0.50 0.29 0.16 0.35 0.48 0.16 1.67 0.17 0.13 0.45 0.25 -0.74 Benef. 1.41 9.33 -0.03 false 
Barbados 0.85 0.88 4.92   0.47 0.43 0.33 0.60 0.68 0.14 1.69 0.05 0.01 0.55 0.25 -0.68 Benef. 2.03 29.45 -0.01 false 
Fiji 0.74   4.86 -7.99 0.43 0.43 0.28 0.54 0.67 0.18 1.71 0.22 0.17 0.65 0.23 -0.56 Benef. 2.02 17.81 -0.01 false 
Gambia 0.42 0.46   5.60 0.42 0.20 0.20 0.56 0.41 -0.09 1.72 0.26 0.21 0.72 0.20 -0.55 Benef. 1.01 2.58 -0.15 false 
Congo 0.53    7.90 0.34 0.41 0.12 0.13 0.47 0.35 1.75 0.22 0.16 0.28 0.20 -0.24 Benef. 1.92 3.53 -0.10 false 
Sierra Leone   1.09 1.07 6.96 0.32 0.50 0.18 0.25 0.68 0.46 1.75 0.49 0.44 0.66 0.22 -0.18 Benef. 2.31 1.42 -0.51 true 
Ghana 0.53 0.56 1.60 4.43 3.70 0.31 0.44 0.16 0.24 0.60 0.38 1.76 0.32 0.26 0.47 0.25 -0.13 Benef. 2.06 1.47 -0.51 true 
Kenya 0.52 0.50 1.79 6.12 -0.24 0.28 0.45 0.12 0.20 0.57 0.39 1.76 0.36 0.30 0.47 0.25 0.03 Benef. 2.09 1.13 -1.95 true 
Cyprus      0.26      1.76 0.47 0.41 0.41 0.24 0.12 Benef.  19.28   
Table 4: Evaluation of the Beneficial Brain Drain Effect (using dh = 0.1) 
 
Developing 
country 
HDI 
1995 
KEI 
1995 ASEExp 
GDP 
growth 
2000 
EM1 
1990 
humi 
2000 
Hi 
1990 
Hi 
2000 
Hi 
transf= 
∆hi+ 
dh*hilag m' PSI 
PSI 
(m=0) 
 
 
 
 
deriv-
psi 
Benef 
Brain 
Drain 
Net 
growth 
effect 
mi= 
EM5 
Hi(1-Hi)/              
(1-mi) 
Benef 
mig 
incr 
Bangladesh 0.45 0.82 1.71 5.94 0.02 0.36 0.17 0.37 0.22 1.57 0.25 0.24 0.39 0.24 1.44 Benef. 1.74 0.35 0.36 true 
Benin 0.40 1.70 2.71 5.80 0.07 0.53 0.14 0.56 0.43 1.64 0.31 0.29 0.41 0.24 1.16 Benef. 2.39 0.41 0.42 true 
Burkina Faso 0.31 0.98 1.38 2.15 0.02 0.30 0.11 0.31 0.21 1.56 0.30 0.30 0.39 0.24 1.47 Benef. 1.46 0.14 0.25 true 
Cameroon 0.49 1.34 2.32 4.20 0.13 0.50 0.14 0.54 0.42 1.70 0.27 0.23 0.36 0.23 0.83 Benef. 2.28 0.65 0.71 true 
Côte d'Ivoire 0.43 1.30 4.54 -2.30 0.03 0.31 0.12 0.32 0.21 1.58 0.32 0.31 0.42 0.24 1.40 Benef. 1.49 0.69 0.71 true 
Ethiopia 0.32 0.76 2.70 5.44 0.08 0.49 0.23 0.51 0.31 1.65 0.35 0.32 0.52 0.25 1.12 Benef. 2.24 0.36 0.39 true 
Ghana 0.53 1.60 4.43 3.70 0.38 0.44 0.24 0.60 0.38 1.74 0.31 0.26 0.47 0.25 -0.39 Benef. 2.06 1.47 -0.51 true 
Haiti 0.45 0.86 1.59 1.12 0.79 0.39 0.74 0.80 0.13 1.41 0.20 0.24 0.90 0.09 -0.96 Benef. 1.85 8.79 -0.02 false 
India 0.55 2.79 3.35 3.92 0.03 0.61 0.16 0.62 0.48 1.58 0.24 0.23 0.37 0.23 1.40 Benef. 2.66 0.28 0.33 true 
Kenya 0.52 1.79 6.12 -0.24 0.43 0.45 0.20 0.57 0.39 1.71 0.34 0.30 0.47 0.25 -0.56 Benef. 2.09 1.13 -1.95 true 
Madagascar 0.46 0.84 1.84 4.80 0.06 0.43 0.16 0.45 0.31 1.62 0.26 0.24 0.38 0.24 1.25 Benef. 2.04 0.87 1.86 false 
Malawi 0.41 1.80 3.83 1.67 0.17 0.43 0.15 0.48 0.35 1.72 0.35 0.30 0.43 0.25 0.62 Benef. 2.03 0.26 0.34 true 
Mozambique 0.33 0.52 3.69 1.60 0.27 0.18 0.03 0.28 0.25 1.76 0.40 0.34 0.37 0.23 0.09 Benef. 0.88 0.82 1.16 false 
Nepal 0.47 2.00 2.07 6.45 0.02 0.47 0.14 0.49 0.36 1.57 0.25 0.24 0.37 0.23 1.45 Benef. 2.19 0.18 0.31 true 
Nicaragua 0.64 2.17 2.64 4.29 0.30 0.39 0.45 0.47 0.06 1.76 0.23 0.17 0.58 0.24 -0.06 Benef. 1.83 6.96 -0.04 false 
Nigeria 0.42 1.63 0.80 3.78 0.08 0.65 0.11 0.68 0.58 1.65 0.26 0.23 0.33 0.22 1.12 Benef. 2.79 0.36 0.34 true 
Pakistan 0.49 1.81 2.39 4.43 0.07 0.39 0.18 0.42 0.26 1.63 0.26 0.23 0.39 0.24 1.18 Benef. 1.84 0.80 1.22 false 
Senegal 0.42 1.77 3.44 5.60 0.12 0.17 0.09 0.20 0.12 1.69 0.33 0.29 0.37 0.23 0.88 Benef. 0.83 2.44 -0.11 true 
Sudan 0.47 0.65 0.86 8.30 0.05 0.52 0.19 0.54 0.37 1.61 0.23 0.21 0.38 0.24 1.28 Benef. 2.37 0.22 0.32 true 
Tanzania 0.42 1.04 3.40 5.07 0.12 0.51 0.15 0.55 0.41 1.68 0.33 0.29 0.42 0.24 0.92 Benef. 2.34 0.37 0.40 true 
Uganda 0.41 1.18 2.19 3.50 0.44 0.46 0.19 0.57 0.40 1.71 0.31 0.27 0.44 0.25 -0.60 Benef. 2.15 0.68 0.75 false 
Zambia 0.42 2.72 1.99 3.47 0.17 0.49 0.18 0.53 0.37 1.72 0.31 0.26 0.42 0.24 0.63 Benef. 2.24 0.64 0.69 false 
Zimbabwe 0.59 2.97 7.47 -4.88 0.08 0.55 0.16 0.58 0.44 1.64 0.32 0.29 0.44 0.25 1.15 Benef. 2.47 1.09 -2.63 true 
Algeria 0.67 2.04 4.50 2.40 0.07 0.14 0.05 0.15 0.11 1.64 0.22 0.19 0.23 0.18 1.17 Benef. 0.70 6.17 -0.03 true 
Bolivia 0.64 3.78 5.53 2.37 0.06 0.51 0.30 0.52 0.25 1.63 0.26 0.23 0.50 0.25 1.21 Benef. 2.33 1.44 -0.57 true 
Brazil 0.75 4.62 4.84 4.50 0.02 0.43 0.28 0.44 0.19 1.56 0.17 0.17 0.41 0.24 1.47 Benef. 2.04 0.44 0.44 true 
Bulgaria 0.78 6.08 3.15 5.80 0.04 0.16 0.21 0.17 -0.02 1.59 0.13 0.11 0.30 0.21 1.35 Benef. 0.81 8.01 -0.02 true 
China 0.68 2.85 2.03 7.94 0.03 0.48 0.23 0.49 0.28 1.58 0.15 0.14 0.34 0.23 1.39 Benef. 2.22 0.20 0.31 true 
Colombia 0.75 4.47 3.13 2.81 0.09 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.05 1.66 0.16 0.13 0.52 0.25 1.06 Benef. 1.97 2.34 -0.18 true 
Dominican 
Republic 0.70 3.39 2.10 7.75 0.18 0.27 0.44 0.32 -0.08 1.73 0.18 0.13 0.53 0.25 0.54 Benef. 1.30 11.04 -0.02 true 
Ecuador 0.73 3.44 3.17 2.33 0.06 0.28 0.44 0.30 -0.10 1.62 0.16 0.14 0.54 0.25 1.26 Benef. 1.37 5.66 -0.05 true 
Egypt 0.61 3.82 4.41 5.12 0.06 0.59 0.21 0.60 0.41 1.62 0.24 0.22 0.41 0.24 1.24 Benef. 2.61 0.72 0.85 true 
El Salvador 0.69 3.76 2.18 1.97 0.33 0.19 0.45 0.25 -0.15 1.75 0.19 0.14 0.54 0.25 -0.20 Benef. 0.95 17.09 -0.01 false 
Guatemala 0.62 1.70 1.52 3.33 0.20 0.19 0.31 0.24 -0.05 1.74 0.21 0.16 0.44 0.25 0.42 Benef. 0.94 6.89 -0.03 true 
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Honduras 0.64 2.93 3.48 4.79 0.22 0.24 0.44 0.29 -0.11 1.75 0.24 0.19 0.59 0.24 0.32 Benef. 1.17 6.72 -0.04 true 
Indonesia 0.66 3.23 0.65 4.77 0.04 0.46 0.17 0.47 0.31 1.60 0.13 0.12 0.27 0.20 1.34 Benef. 2.15 0.21 0.31 true 
Iran 0.69 2.99 3.19 5.37 0.25 0.59 0.27 0.62 0.38 1.75 0.21 0.16 0.40 0.24 0.16 Benef. 2.59 1.43 -0.54 true 
Jamaica 0.72 5.09 6.84 0.79 0.85 0.43 0.76 0.83 0.15 1.35 0.17 0.22 0.90 0.09 -0.94 Benef. 2.01 30.60 0.00 false 
Jordan 0.71 4.04 5.61 3.88 0.09 0.56 0.29 0.57 0.32 1.65 0.23 0.20 0.46 0.25 1.09 Benef. 2.50 2.05 -0.23 true 
Morocco 0.58 2.93 4.72 0.87 0.22 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.04 1.75 0.30 0.24 0.35 0.23 0.35 Benef. 0.64 7.23 -0.02 true 
Paraguay 0.74 3.17 3.47 -0.30 0.04 0.46 0.25 0.47 0.24 1.59 0.15 0.14 0.37 0.23 1.36 Benef. 2.12 0.61 0.64 true 
Peru 0.73 4.13 2.60 3.13 0.06 0.47 0.36 0.48 0.16 1.62 0.15 0.12 0.45 0.25 1.25 Benef. 2.18 2.31 -0.19 true 
Philippines 0.74 4.18 2.91 4.01 0.13 0.67 0.21 0.70 0.51 1.69 0.17 0.13 0.32 0.22 0.84 Benef. 2.85 3.81 -0.07 true 
Romania 0.77 5.34 3.32 1.64 0.09 0.31 0.27 0.34 0.10 1.66 0.16 0.12 0.37 0.23 1.06 Benef. 1.52 3.61 -0.09 true 
Sri Lanka 0.73 3.34 2.65 6.00 0.29 0.40 0.27 0.48 0.24 1.76 0.19 0.13 0.37 0.23 -0.01 Benef. 1.88 2.24 -0.20 true 
Swaziland 0.60 8.80 6.50 2.55 0.00 0.56 0.22 0.56 0.37 1.54 0.27 0.27 0.46 0.25 1.53 Benef. 2.51 0.34 0.37 true 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 0.67 2.36 2.60 2.50 0.07 0.44 0.23 0.46 0.25 1.63 0.18 0.15 0.36 0.23 1.18 Benef. 2.07 1.30 -0.84 true 
Thailand 0.75 4.96 3.45 4.31 0.02 0.45 0.25 0.45 0.23 1.57 0.14 0.14 0.36 0.23 1.42 Benef. 2.08 0.59 0.60 true 
Tunisia 0.70 3.41 6.63 4.71 0.18 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.07 1.73 0.28 0.23 0.32 0.22 0.56 Benef. 0.74 5.86 -0.03 true 
Argentina 0.83 5.99 3.20 -0.52 0.04 0.48 0.30 0.49 0.22 1.59 0.10 0.09 0.36 0.23 1.36 Benef. 2.23 1.15 -1.65 true 
Botswana 0.66 4.07 7.80 3.43 0.02 0.34 0.12 0.35 0.24 1.57 0.28 0.27 0.38 0.23 1.43 Benef. 1.63 0.44 0.40 true 
Chile 0.82 6.19 3.41 5.38 0.07 0.47 0.33 0.49 0.19 1.63 0.13 0.10 0.40 0.24 1.19 Benef. 2.20 1.84 -0.30 true 
Costa Rica 0.81 5.88 5.07 1.66 0.08 0.45 0.40 0.47 0.11 1.65 0.17 0.14 0.50 0.25 1.11 Benef. 2.10 2.80 -0.14 true 
Hungary 0.81 6.73 4.58 5.15 0.14 0.39 0.29 0.43 0.17 1.71 0.17 0.13 0.39 0.24 0.76 Benef. 1.86 3.60 -0.09 true 
Malaysia 0.76 5.38 4.26 8.30 0.25 0.59 0.19 0.62 0.45 1.75 0.20 0.15 0.32 0.22 0.19 Benef. 2.62 1.35 -0.67 true 
Mauritius 0.75 4.97 3.25 8.02 0.65 0.29 0.35 0.48 0.16 1.54 0.13 0.13 0.45 0.25 -0.93 Benef. 1.41 9.33 -0.03 false 
Mexico 0.78 5.17 4.53 6.86 0.11 0.14 0.31 0.17 -0.11 1.67 0.18 0.14 0.42 0.24 0.97 Benef. 0.72 11.33 -0.01 true 
Poland 0.82 6.38 5.06 4.00 0.14 0.40 0.28 0.43 0.18 1.71 0.18 0.14 0.39 0.24 0.76 Benef. 1.88 3.93 -0.08 true 
South Africa 0.74 5.73 6.94 3.08 0.10 0.63 0.22 0.64 0.45 1.67 0.25 0.21 0.41 0.24 1.02 Benef. 2.72 1.14 -1.58 true 
Turkey 0.71 5.20 3.17 7.22 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.09 -0.01 1.65 0.18 0.15 0.25 0.19 1.11 Benef. 0.44 3.98 -0.03 true 
Uruguay 0.82 6.24 3.03 -1.27 0.07 0.41 0.36 0.43 0.11 1.63 0.12 0.09 0.41 0.24 1.18 Benef. 1.95 2.89 -0.13 true 
Venezuela 0.77 4.78 5.01 3.21 0.04 0.60 0.26 0.61 0.37 1.59 0.17 0.16 0.39 0.24 1.35 Benef. 2.64 1.41 -0.58 true 
 
 
ASEExp: Adjusted savings: education expenditure (% of GNI) 2000 
dh = 0.1 
m’ = (1+m)/ (0.65 + m²) 
Deriv-PSIzero = 1.538 
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Table 5: Evaluation of the Beneficial Brain Drain Effect (using dh = 0.05) 
 
Developing 
country 
HDI 
1995 
KEI 
1995 
ASE
Exp. 
GDP 
growth 
2000 
EM1 
1990 
humi 
2000 
Hi 
1990 
Hi 
2000 
Hi 
transf= 
∆hi+ 
dh*hilag m' PSI 
PSI 
(m=0) 
 
 
 
 
deriv-
psi 
Benef 
Brain 
Drain 
Net 
grwth 
effect 
mi= 
EM5 
Hi(1-
Hi)/              
(1-mi) 
Benef 
mig 
incr 
Bangladesh 0.45 0.82 1.71 5.94 0.02 0.36 0.17 0.37 0.21 1.57 0.25 0.24 0.40 0.24 1.44 Benef. 1.74 0.35 0.36 true 
Benin 0.40 1.70 2.71 5.80 0.07 0.53 0.14 0.56 0.42 1.64 0.31 0.29 0.42 0.24 1.16 Benef. 2.39 0.41 0.42 true 
Burkina 
Faso 0.31 0.98 1.38 2.15 0.02 0.30 0.11 0.31 0.21 1.56 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.24 1.47 Benef. 1.46 0.14 0.25 true 
Cameroon 0.49 1.34 2.32 4.20 0.13 0.50 0.14 0.54 0.41 1.70 0.27 0.23 0.36 0.23 0.83 Benef. 2.28 0.65 0.71 true 
Côte d'Ivoire 0.43 1.30 4.54 -2.30 0.03 0.31 0.12 0.32 0.21 1.58 0.32 0.31 0.42 0.24 1.40 Benef. 1.49 0.69 0.71 true 
Ethiopia 0.32 0.76 2.70 5.44 0.08 0.49 0.23 0.51 0.30 1.65 0.35 0.32 0.53 0.25 1.12 Benef. 2.24 0.36 0.39 true 
Ghana 0.53 1.60 4.43 3.70 0.38 0.44 0.24 0.60 0.37 1.74 0.31 0.26 0.49 0.25 -0.39 Benef. 2.06 1.47 -0.51 true 
Haiti 0.45 0.86 1.59 1.12 0.79 0.39 0.74 0.80 0.09 1.41 0.20 0.24 0.94 0.06 -0.96 Benef. 1.85 8.79 -0.02 false 
India 0.55 2.79 3.35 3.92 0.03 0.61 0.16 0.62 0.47 1.58 0.24 0.23 0.38 0.23 1.40 Benef. 2.66 0.28 0.33 true 
Kenya 0.52 1.79 6.12 -0.24 0.43 0.45 0.20 0.57 0.38 1.71 0.34 0.30 0.48 0.25 -0.56 Benef. 2.09 1.13 -1.95 true 
Madagascar 0.46 0.84 1.84 4.80 0.06 0.43 0.16 0.45 0.30 1.62 0.26 0.24 0.39 0.24 1.25 Benef. 2.04 0.87 1.86 false 
Malawi 0.41 1.80 3.83 1.67 0.17 0.43 0.15 0.48 0.35 1.72 0.35 0.30 0.44 0.25 0.62 Benef. 2.03 0.26 0.34 true 
Mozambique 0.33 0.52 3.69 1.60 0.27 0.18 0.03 0.28 0.25 1.76 0.40 0.34 0.37 0.23 0.09 Benef. 0.88 0.82 1.16 false 
Nepal 0.47 2.00 2.07 6.45 0.02 0.47 0.14 0.49 0.35 1.57 0.25 0.24 0.37 0.23 1.45 Benef. 2.19 0.18 0.31 true 
Nicaragua 0.64 2.17 2.64 4.29 0.30 0.39 0.45 0.47 0.04 1.76 0.23 0.17 0.60 0.24 -0.06 Benef. 1.83 6.96 -0.04 false 
Nigeria 0.42 1.63 0.80 3.78 0.08 0.65 0.11 0.68 0.57 1.65 0.26 0.23 0.34 0.22 1.12 Benef. 2.79 0.36 0.34 true 
Pakistan 0.49 1.81 2.39 4.43 0.07 0.39 0.18 0.42 0.25 1.63 0.26 0.23 0.40 0.24 1.18 Benef. 1.84 0.80 1.22 false 
Senegal 0.42 1.77 3.44 5.60 0.12 0.17 0.09 0.20 0.11 1.69 0.33 0.29 0.37 0.23 0.88 Benef. 0.83 2.44 -0.11 true 
Sudan 0.47 0.65 0.86 8.30 0.05 0.52 0.19 0.54 0.36 1.61 0.23 0.21 0.39 0.24 1.28 Benef. 2.37 0.22 0.32 true 
Tanzania 0.42 1.04 3.40 5.07 0.12 0.51 0.15 0.55 0.40 1.68 0.33 0.29 0.43 0.24 0.92 Benef. 2.34 0.37 0.40 true 
Uganda 0.41 1.18 2.19 3.50 0.44 0.46 0.19 0.57 0.39 1.71 0.31 0.27 0.45 0.25 -0.60 Benef. 2.15 0.68 0.75 false 
Zambia 0.42 2.72 1.99 3.47 0.17 0.49 0.18 0.53 0.36 1.72 0.31 0.26 0.42 0.24 0.63 Benef. 2.24 0.64 0.69 false 
Zimbabwe 0.59 2.97 7.47 -4.88 0.08 0.55 0.16 0.58 0.43 1.64 0.32 0.29 0.45 0.25 1.15 Benef. 2.47 1.09 -2.63 true 
Algeria 0.67 2.04 4.50 2.40 0.07 0.14 0.05 0.15 0.11 1.64 0.22 0.19 0.24 0.18 1.17 Benef. 0.70 6.17 -0.03 true 
Bolivia 0.64 3.78 5.53 2.37 0.06 0.51 0.30 0.52 0.24 1.63 0.26 0.23 0.52 0.25 1.21 Benef. 2.33 1.44 -0.57 true 
Brazil 0.75 4.62 4.84 4.50 0.02 0.43 0.28 0.44 0.18 1.56 0.17 0.17 0.43 0.24 1.47 Benef. 2.04 0.44 0.44 true 
Bulgaria 0.78 6.08 3.15 5.80 0.04 0.16 0.21 0.17 -0.03 1.59 0.13 0.11 0.31 0.22 1.35 Benef. 0.81 8.01 -0.02 true 
China 0.68 2.85 2.03 7.94 0.03 0.48 0.23 0.49 0.27 1.58 0.15 0.14 0.36 0.23 1.39 Benef. 2.22 0.20 0.31 true 
Colombia 0.75 4.47 3.13 2.81 0.09 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.03 1.66 0.16 0.13 0.54 0.25 1.06 Benef. 1.97 2.34 -0.18 true 
Dominican 
Republic 0.70 3.39 2.10 7.75 0.18 0.27 0.44 0.32 -0.10 1.73 0.18 0.13 0.55 0.25 0.54 Benef. 1.30 
11.0
4 -0.02 true 
Ecuador 0.73 3.44 3.17 2.33 0.06 0.28 0.44 0.30 -0.12 1.62 0.16 0.14 0.56 0.25 1.26 Benef. 1.37 5.66 -0.05 true 
Egypt 0.61 3.82 4.41 5.12 0.06 0.59 0.21 0.60 0.40 1.62 0.24 0.22 0.42 0.24 1.24 Benef. 2.61 0.72 0.85 true 
El Salvador 0.69 3.76 2.18 1.97 0.33 0.19 0.45 0.25 -0.17 1.75 0.19 0.14 0.57 0.25 -0.20 Benef. 0.95 
17.0
9 -0.01 false 
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Developing 
country 
HDI 
1995 
KEI 
1995 
ASE
Exp. 
GDP 
growth 
2000 
EM1 
1990 
humi 
2000 
Hi 
1990 
Hi 
2000 
Hi 
transf= 
∆hi+ 
dh*hilag m' PSI 
PSI 
(m=0) 
 
 
 
 
deriv-
psi 
Benef 
Brain 
Drain 
Net 
grwth 
effect 
mi= 
EM5 
Hi(1-
Hi)/      
(1-mi) 
Benef 
mig 
incr 
Guatemala 0.62 1.70 1.52 3.33 0.20 0.19 0.31 0.24 -0.06 1.74 0.21 0.16 0.45 0.25 0.42 Benef. 0.94 6.89 -0.03 true 
Honduras 0.64 2.93 3.48 4.79 0.22 0.24 0.44 0.29 -0.13 1.75 0.24 0.19 0.61 0.24 0.32 Benef. 1.17 6.72 -0.04 true 
Indonesia 0.66 3.23 0.65 4.77 0.04 0.46 0.17 0.47 0.30 1.60 0.13 0.12 0.28 0.20 1.34 Benef. 2.15 0.21 0.31 true 
Iran 0.69 2.99 3.19 5.37 0.25 0.59 0.27 0.62 0.37 1.75 0.21 0.16 0.41 0.24 0.16 Benef. 2.59 1.43 -0.54 true 
Jamaica 0.72 5.09 6.84 0.79 0.85 0.43 0.76 0.83 0.12 1.35 0.17 0.22 0.94 0.06 -0.94 Benef. 2.01 
30.6
0 0.00 false 
Jordan 0.71 4.04 5.61 3.88 0.09 0.56 0.29 0.57 0.30 1.65 0.23 0.20 0.47 0.25 1.09 Benef. 2.50 2.05 -0.23 true 
Morocco 0.58 2.93 4.72 0.87 0.22 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.04 1.75 0.30 0.24 0.36 0.23 0.35 Benef. 0.64 7.23 -0.02 true 
Paraguay 0.74 3.17 3.47 -0.30 0.04 0.46 0.25 0.47 0.23 1.59 0.15 0.14 0.38 0.24 1.36 Benef. 2.12 0.61 0.64 true 
Peru 0.73 4.13 2.60 3.13 0.06 0.47 0.36 0.48 0.14 1.62 0.15 0.12 0.46 0.25 1.25 Benef. 2.18 2.31 -0.19 true 
Philippines 0.74 4.18 2.91 4.01 0.13 0.67 0.21 0.70 0.50 1.69 0.17 0.13 0.33 0.22 0.84 Benef. 2.85 3.81 -0.07 true 
Romania 0.77 5.34 3.32 1.64 0.09 0.31 0.27 0.34 0.08 1.66 0.16 0.12 0.38 0.24 1.06 Benef. 1.52 3.61 -0.09 true 
Sri Lanka 0.73 3.34 2.65 6.00 0.29 0.40 0.27 0.48 0.23 1.76 0.19 0.13 0.38 0.24 -0.01 Benef. 1.88 2.24 -0.20 true 
Swaziland 0.60 8.80 6.50 2.55 0.00 0.56 0.22 0.56 0.36 1.54 0.27 0.27 0.47 0.25 1.53 Benef. 2.51 0.34 0.37 true 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 0.67 2.36 2.60 2.50 0.07 0.44 0.23 0.46 0.24 1.63 0.18 0.15 0.38 0.23 1.18 Benef. 2.07 1.30 -0.84 true 
Thailand 0.75 4.96 3.45 4.31 0.02 0.45 0.25 0.45 0.22 1.57 0.14 0.14 0.37 0.23 1.42 Benef. 2.08 0.59 0.60 true 
Tunisia 0.70 3.41 6.63 4.71 0.18 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.06 1.73 0.28 0.23 0.33 0.22 0.56 Benef. 0.74 5.86 -0.03 true 
Argentina 0.83 5.99 3.20 -0.52 0.04 0.48 0.30 0.49 0.21 1.59 0.10 0.09 0.37 0.23 1.36 Benef. 2.23 1.15 -1.65 true 
Botswana 0.66 4.07 7.80 3.43 0.02 0.34 0.12 0.35 0.23 1.57 0.28 0.27 0.38 0.24 1.43 Benef. 1.63 0.44 0.40 true 
Chile 0.82 6.19 3.41 5.38 0.07 0.47 0.33 0.49 0.18 1.63 0.13 0.10 0.42 0.24 1.19 Benef. 2.20 1.84 -0.30 true 
Costa Rica 0.81 5.88 5.07 1.66 0.08 0.45 0.40 0.47 0.09 1.65 0.17 0.14 0.52 0.25 1.11 Benef. 2.10 2.80 -0.14 true 
Hungary 0.81 6.73 4.58 5.15 0.14 0.39 0.29 0.43 0.15 1.71 0.17 0.13 0.40 0.24 0.76 Benef. 1.86 3.60 -0.09 true 
Malaysia 0.76 5.38 4.26 8.30 0.25 0.59 0.19 0.62 0.44 1.75 0.20 0.15 0.33 0.22 0.19 Benef. 2.62 1.35 -0.67 true 
Mauritius 0.75 4.97 3.25 8.02 0.65 0.29 0.35 0.48 0.15 1.54 0.13 0.13 0.47 0.25 -0.93 Benef. 1.41 9.33 -0.03 false 
Mexico 0.78 5.17 4.53 6.86 0.11 0.14 0.31 0.17 -0.13 1.67 0.18 0.14 0.43 0.25 0.97 Benef. 0.72 
11.3
3 -0.01 true 
Poland 0.82 6.38 5.06 4.00 0.14 0.40 0.28 0.43 0.16 1.71 0.18 0.14 0.40 0.24 0.76 Benef. 1.88 3.93 -0.08 true 
South Africa 0.74 5.73 6.94 3.08 0.10 0.63 0.22 0.64 0.44 1.67 0.25 0.21 0.42 0.24 1.02 Benef. 2.72 1.14 -1.58 true 
Turkey 0.71 5.20 3.17 7.22 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.09 -0.02 1.65 0.18 0.15 0.26 0.19 1.11 Benef. 0.44 3.98 -0.03 true 
Uruguay 0.82 6.24 3.03 -1.27 0.07 0.41 0.36 0.43 0.10 1.63 0.12 0.09 0.43 0.25 1.18 Benef. 1.95 2.89 -0.13 true 
Venezuela 0.77 4.78 5.01 3.21 0.04 0.60 0.26 0.61 0.36 1.59 0.17 0.16 0.41 0.24 1.35 Benef. 2.64 1.41 -0.58 true 
 
 
ASEExp: Adjusted savings: education expenditure (% of GNI) 2000 
dh = 0.05 
m’ = (1+m)/ (0.65 + m²) 
Deriv-PSIzero = 1.538 
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Table 6: Optimal level of human capital when the destination country  Table 7: Standard Deviation of the optimal level of human capital   
                is the Average Northern Countries                                                                     for the Average Northern Countries as Destination 
      
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ϑS*% (Average Northern Countries) 
Northern Countries (Destination)                   
m 0 0.1 0.33 0.5 0.75 1 
Albania 6.01 7.817 11.972 15.044 19.560 24.077 
Algeria -0.20 0.195 1.096 1.762 2.741 3.739 
Azerbaijan 2.85 4.727 9.038 12.224 16.909 21.686 
Bangladesh 1.14 4.004 10.584 15.447 22.599 29.989 
Brazil 4.71 5.831 8.402 10.302 13.096 15.853 
Bulgaria 5.90 7.208 10.216 12.439 15.708 18.929 
China 5.25 8.047 14.477 19.230 26.219 33.331 
Colombia 3.66 4.582 6.714 8.289 10.606 12.894 
Côte d'Ivoire 0.09 1.545 4.892 7.366 11.005 14.765 
Ecuador 17.69 23.027 35.297 44.366 57.704 71.094 
Ethiopia -0.55 0.857 4.099 6.496 10.021 13.680 
Georgia 7.01 9.396 14.888 18.948 24.918 30.921 
Ghana 0.12 1.745 5.475 8.231 12.286 16.478 
India 1.30 2.804 6.258 8.811 12.565 16.413 
Indonesia 11.92 17.349 29.839 39.070 52.646 66.439 
Iran 3.73 4.731 7.024 8.719 11.211 13.680 
Jordan 3.41 4.406 6.702 8.399 10.894 13.376 
Kenya -0.55 0.403 2.586 4.200 6.573 9.033 
Malaysia 3.10 3.568 4.645 5.441 6.612 7.722 
Mexico 4.48 5.275 7.109 8.464 10.457 12.386 
Morocco 0.88 1.794 3.885 5.431 7.705 10.022 
Pakistan 5.26 8.256 15.137 20.224 27.705 35.328 
Peru 4.51 6.341 10.557 13.673 18.256 22.882 
Philippines 2.57 4.457 8.794 12.000 16.714 21.529 
Romania 3.67 5.225 8.796 11.436 15.318 19.236 
Russian  Federation 5.12 6.366 9.227 11.342 14.452 17.528 
Serbia & Monte-negro 3.29 5.026 9.014 11.962 16.297 20.697 
South Africa 2.21 3.264 5.680 7.465 10.091 12.740 
Tajikistan 1.49 3.808 9.141 13.083 18.880 24.850 
Tanzania -0.08 3.113 10.449 15.871 23.845 32.124 
Thailand 3.26 4.251 6.540 8.232 10.720 13.198 
Ukraine 1.58 2.629 5.054 6.847 9.482 12.158 
Vietnam 0.63 2.090 5.440 7.916 11.557 15.306 
Yemen 0.58 1.158 2.496 3.486 4.941 6.414 
ϑS*% (Standard Deviation) 
Northern Countries (Destination) 
m 0.1 0.33 0.5 0.75 1 
Albania 0.453 1.496 2.267 3.400 4.534 
Algeria 0.085 0.282 0.427 0.640 0.902 
Azerbaijan 0.409 1.348 2.043 3.064 4.317 
Bangladesh 0.556 1.835 2.780 4.170 6.213 
Brazil 0.305 1.008 1.527 2.290 2.974 
Bulgaria 0.361 1.192 1.806 2.709 3.507 
China 0.618 2.041 3.092 4.639 6.494 
Colombia 0.252 0.831 1.259 1.888 2.455 
Côte d'Ivoire 0.283 0.933 1.414 2.121 3.161 
Ecuador 1.303 4.298 6.513 9.769 13.152 
Ethiopia 0.263 0.868 1.315 1.972 3.006 
Georgia 0.577 1.903 2.883 4.324 5.845 
Ghana 0.314 1.035 1.568 2.351 3.514 
India 0.313 1.033 1.566 2.349 3.378 
Indonesia 1.215 4.011 6.077 9.115 12.698 
Iran 0.266 0.877 1.329 1.994 2.607 
Jordan 0.260 0.859 1.301 1.951 2.570 
Kenya 0.180 0.593 0.899 1.349 2.038 
Malaysia 0.159 0.524 0.794 1.191 1.474 
Mexico 0.243 0.802 1.216 1.824 2.303 
Morocco 0.198 0.655 0.992 1.489 2.096 
Pakistan 0.654 2.159 3.271 4.907 6.905 
Peru 0.431 1.422 2.155 3.233 4.414 
Philippines 0.406 1.338 2.028 3.041 4.312 
Romania 0.365 1.205 1.826 2.739 3.740 
Russian  Federation 0.336 1.108 1.678 2.517 3.280 
Serbia & Monte-negro 0.391 1.291 1.956 2.933 4.073 
South Africa 0.248 0.818 1.240 1.860 2.536 
Tajikistan 0.464 1.532 2.321 3.482 5.109 
Tanzania 0.593 1.958 2.967 4.450 6.792 
Thailand 0.257 0.848 1.284 1.927 2.545 
Ukraine 0.237 0.783 1.186 1.779 2.473 
Vietnam 0.293 0.966 1.464 2.197 3.216 
Yemen 0.134 0.441 0.669 1.003 1.382 
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    Table 8: Optimal level of human capital when the destination country  Table 9: Standard Deviation of the optimal level of human capital   
                  is the Middle East                                                                                                for the Middle East as Destination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ϑS*% (Standard deviation) 
Middle East 
m 0.1 0.33 0.5 0.75 1 
Albania 0.222 0.732 1.108 1.663 2.217 
Algeria 0.042 0.138 0.209 0.313 0.417 
Azerbaijan 0.200 0.659 0.999 1.498 1.997 
Bahrain 0.272 0.897 1.359 2.039 2.718 
Brazil 0.149 0.493 0.747 1.120 1.493 
Bulgaria 0.177 0.583 0.883 1.325 1.766 
China 0.302 0.998 1.512 2.268 3.024 
Colombia 0.123 0.406 0.615 0.923 1.231 
Côte d'Ivoire 0.138 0.456 0.691 1.037 1.383 
Ecuador 0.637 2.102 3.184 4.776 6.369 
Ethiopia 0.129 0.424 0.643 0.964 1.286 
Georgia 0.282 0.930 1.409 2.114 2.819 
Ghana 0.153 0.506 0.766 1.150 1.533 
India 0.153 0.505 0.766 1.148 1.531 
Indonesia 0.594 1.961 2.971 4.457 5.943 
Iran 0.130 0.429 0.650 0.975 1.300 
Jordan 0.127 0.420 0.636 0.954 1.272 
Kenya 0.088 0.290 0.440 0.659 0.879 
Malaysia 0.078 0.256 0.388 0.582 0.776 
Mexico 0.119 0.392 0.594 0.892 1.189 
Morocco 0.097 0.320 0.485 0.728 0.971 
Pakistan 0.320 1.056 1.599 2.399 3.199 
Peru 0.211 0.695 1.054 1.581 2.107 
Philippines 0.198 0.654 0.991 1.487 1.983 
Romania 0.179 0.589 0.893 1.339 1.786 
Russian  
Federation 0.164 0.542 0.820 1.231 1.641 
Serbia & 
Montenegro 0.191 0.631 0.956 1.434 1.912 
South Africa 0.121 0.400 0.606 0.909 1.213 
Tajikistan 0.227 0.749 1.135 1.702 2.270 
Tanzania 0.290 0.957 1.451 2.176 2.901 
Thailand 0.126 0.414 0.628 0.942 1.256 
Ukraine 0.116 0.383 0.580 0.870 1.160 
Vietnam 0.143 0.473 0.716 1.074 1.432 
Yemen 0.065 0.216 0.327 0.490 0.654 
ϑS*% (Average Middle East) 
Middle East 
m 0 0.1 0.33 0.5 0.75 1 
Albania 6.01 6.710 8.318 9.507 11.255 13.003 
Algeria -0.20 -0.014 0.408 0.719 1.178 1.636 
Azerbaijan 2.85 3.729 5.745 7.235 9.426 11.617 
Bahrain 6.84 7.769 9.917 11.504 13.838 16.171 
Brazil 4.71 5.086 5.941 6.573 7.502 8.431 
Bulgaria 5.90 6.325 7.304 8.028 9.092 10.156 
China 5.25 6.536 9.492 11.677 14.889 18.102 
Colombia 3.66 3.967 4.685 5.215 5.995 6.774 
Côte d'Ivoire 0.09 0.854 2.613 3.912 5.824 7.735 
Ecuador 17.69 19.846 24.799 28.460 33.844 39.229 
Ethiopia -0.55 0.214 1.980 3.285 5.204 7.122 
Georgia 7.01 7.988 10.242 11.907 14.357 16.806 
Ghana 0.12 0.979 2.948 4.403 6.543 8.683 
India 1.30 2.039 3.734 4.987 6.829 8.671 
Indonesia 11.92 14.380 20.043 24.228 30.383 36.537 
Iran 3.73 4.082 4.881 5.472 6.341 7.210 
Jordan 3.41 3.771 4.605 5.222 6.129 7.036 
Kenya -0.55 -0.036 1.137 2.004 3.279 4.554 
Malaysia 3.10 3.180 3.365 3.502 3.703 3.904 
Mexico 4.48 4.682 5.149 5.494 6.002 6.510 
Morocco 0.88 1.309 2.286 3.007 4.069 5.131 
Pakistan 5.26 6.658 9.864 12.235 15.720 19.206 
Peru 4.51 5.288 7.083 8.410 10.361 12.312 
Philippines 2.57 3.466 5.526 7.048 9.286 11.525 
Romania 3.67 4.333 5.852 6.976 8.628 10.280 
Russian  
Federation 5.12 5.546 6.522 7.243 8.305 9.366 
Serbia & 
Montenegro 3.29 4.070 5.862 7.186 9.133 11.080 
South Africa 2.21 2.659 3.681 4.437 5.548 6.660 
Tajikistan 1.49 2.674 5.400 7.414 10.376 13.338 
Tanzania -0.08 1.664 5.666 8.625 12.976 17.327 
Thailand 3.26 3.624 4.470 5.095 6.014 6.934 
Ukraine 1.58 2.050 3.143 3.950 5.138 6.325 
Vietnam 0.63 1.375 3.080 4.340 6.193 8.045 
Yemen 0.58 0.831 1.419 1.853 2.491 3.130 
Figures 1: Trends in H/H0 for source countries when the average reference countries is 
the country of destination (α =0.1) 
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Figure 2: Trends in H/H0 for source countries when the average reference countries is the 
country of destination (α =0.2) 
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Figure 3: Trends in H/H0 for source countries when the average reference countries is 
the country of destination (α =0.3) 
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Figure 4: Trends in H/H0 for source countries when the average reference countries is the 
country of destination (α =0.4) 
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Figure 5: Trends in H/H0 for source countries when the average reference countries is the 
country of destination (α =0.5) 
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Figure 6: Trends in H/H0 for source countries when the average reference countries is the 
country of destination (α =0.6) 
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Table 10: Trends in Human Capital Level given different α 
 
H/H0 
Country pi α = 0.1 α = 0.2 α = 0.28 α = 0.3 α = 0.4 α = 0.5 α = 0.6 α = 0.7 α = 0.8 
Algeria 0.18 0.93 1.10 1.29 1.36 1.79 2.65 4.78 12.72 90.18 
Angola 0.54 0.64 0.96 1.43 1.61 3.21 8.48 36.38 411.65 52712.56 
Bangladesh 0.02 1.08 1.21 1.37 1.42 1.74 2.32 3.58 7.34 30.96 
Benin 0.10 1.15 1.55 2.10 2.28 3.82 7.85 23.13 140.11 5139.21 
Bolivia 0.03 1.03 1.12 1.21 1.24 1.43 1.74 2.33 3.78 10.02 
Brazil 0.02 0.99 1.01 1.03 1.03 1.07 1.12 1.19 1.33 1.65 
Bulgaria 0.06 1.00 1.09 1.18 1.21 1.39 1.70 2.29 3.76 10.18 
Burkina Faso 0.14 1.17 1.72 2.53 2.82 5.48 13.86 55.71 566.33 58527.49 
Burundi 0.35 1.07 2.00 3.73 4.46 13.00 58.14 549.69 23236.47 41521893.56 
Cameroon 0.20 1.02 1.38 1.87 2.03 3.41 7.03 20.84 127.39 4758.75 
Central African Republic 0.26 1.08 1.75 2.83 3.25 7.40 23.44 132.21 2363.20 755004.94 
Chile 0.08 0.95 0.98 1.02 1.03 1.10 1.21 1.39 1.74 2.75 
China 0.03 1.02 1.10 1.18 1.20 1.35 1.61 2.07 3.16 7.38 
Colombia 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.04 
Costa Rica 0.04 0.98 1.01 1.03 1.04 1.09 1.16 1.27 1.48 2.02 
Côte d'Ivoire 0.10 1.09 1.38 1.74 1.86 2.79 4.90 11.43 46.85 786.96 
Dominican Republic 0.13 0.95 1.07 0.56 1.24 1.50 1.97 2.98 5.89 23.12 
Ecuador 0.07 1.02 1.13 1.20 1.30 1.56 2.02 2.98 5.67 20.58 
Egypt 0.05 1.01 1.09 1.26 1.20 1.37 1.63 2.14 3.34 8.20 
El Salvador 0.16 0.94 1.09 1.18 1.32 1.71 2.43 4.14 10.07 59.53 
Ethiopia 0.21 1.22 2.10 1.27 4.25 10.86 40.37 289.41 7712.85 5477818.11 
Fiji 0.62 0.48 0.63 3.64 0.91 1.48 2.92 8.09 44.23 1320.53 
Gabon 0.25 0.83 0.94 0.84 1.10 1.37 1.86 2.93 6.26 28.53 
Ghana 0.46 0.83 1.40 1.07 2.75 6.79 23.99 159.37 3741.69 2062553.71 
Guatemala 0.11 0.99 1.13 2.37 1.34 1.68 2.31 3.72 8.25 40.48 
Guyana 0.83 0.24 0.37 1.29 0.65 1.36 3.83 18.14 242.50 43348.22 
Honduras 0.12 1.03 1.26 0.57 1.63 2.31 3.74 7.73 25.92 291.11 
Hungary 0.10 0.94 0.98 1.54 1.04 1.12 1.24 1.46 1.90 3.24 
India 0.03 1.07 1.22 1.02 1.44 1.79 2.43 3.86 8.31 38.56 
Indonesia 0.02 1.03 1.09 1.39 1.18 1.31 1.52 1.89 2.72 5.64 
Iran 0.18 0.94 1.11 1.16 1.38 1.84 2.75 5.04 13.80 103.68 
Jamaica 0.82 0.22 0.29 1.31 0.41 0.66 1.26 3.31 16.68 423.07 
Jordan 0.03 1.01 1.06 0.38 1.12 1.22 1.37 1.63 2.18 3.90 
Kenya 0.36 0.91 1.40 1.11 2.46 5.19 14.77 70.93 969.76 181268.79 
Madagascar 0.13 1.18 1.74 2.17 2.86 5.53 13.97 55.99 566.44 57968.87 
Malawi 0.18 1.21 1.95 2.56 3.63 8.28 26.31 149.00 2681.15 868189.78 
Malaysia 0.08 0.96 1.00 3.16 1.07 1.16 1.30 1.54 2.06 3.65 
Mali 0.20 1.14 1.76 1.05 3.08 6.49 18.44 88.41 1204.84 223755.50 
Mauritius 0.53 0.54 0.65 2.72 0.82 1.13 1.76 3.42 10.35 94.74 
Mexico 0.06 0.96 0.99 0.78 1.02 1.06 1.13 1.24 1.44 1.95 
Morocco 0.19 0.96 1.18 1.01 1.56 2.24 3.74 8.06 28.95 373.94 
Mozambique 0.47 0.81 1.38 1.46 2.73 6.80 24.38 165.66 4037.94 2399007.53 
Nepal 0.02 1.13 1.34 2.34 1.69 2.28 3.49 6.60 19.09 159.48 
Nicaragua 0.15 1.03 1.32 1.60 1.80 2.74 4.92 11.86 51.38 963.89 
Niger 0.11 1.24 1.86 1.68 3.15 6.33 16.84 73.05 842.92 112240.01 
Nigeria 0.08 1.13 1.46 2.80 2.04 3.18 5.94 15.11 71.73 1616.09 
Panama 0.13 0.92 0.99 1.89 1.09 1.24 1.48 1.94 3.04 7.44 
Paraguay 0.02 1.02 1.06 1.07 1.13 1.22 1.36 1.61 2.12 3.69 
Peru 0.06 1.00 1.06 1.11 1.16 1.30 1.53 1.95 2.91 6.51 
Philippines 0.17 1.00 1.24 1.14 1.65 2.40 4.08 9.03 33.90 477.92 
Romania 0.09 0.98 1.08 1.55 1.23 1.44 1.82 2.56 4.56 14.37 
Senegal 0.29 0.98 1.45 1.19 2.42 4.76 12.29 50.95 545.38 62495.29 
Sierra Leone 0.33 1.04 1.83 2.16 3.78 9.93 38.37 291.39 8548.74 7357801.77 
South Africa 0.10 0.95 1.03 3.22 1.13 1.29 1.55 2.03 3.19 7.89 
Sudan 0.07 1.12 1.40 1.11 1.86 2.73 4.67 10.43 39.88 582.69 
 48 
H/H0 
Country pi α = 0.1 α = 0.2 α = 0.28 α = 0.3 α = 0.4 α = 0.5 α = 0.6 α = 0.7 α = 0.8 
Syria 0.04 1.03 1.14 1.75 1.29 1.52 1.92 2.72 4.88 15.62 
Tanzania 0.42 0.87 1.43 1.25 2.71 6.36 21.01 126.28 2508.48 989848.27 
Thailand 0.02 1.00 1.03 2.35 1.06 1.11 1.18 1.30 1.53 2.10 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.76 0.27 0.31 1.05 0.37 0.47 0.66 1.09 2.54 13.70 
Tunisia 0.21 0.89 1.05 0.36 1.30 1.71 2.53 4.55 12.07 84.99 
Turkey 0.05 0.98 1.03 1.24 1.09 1.18 1.31 1.54 2.02 3.46 
Uganda 0.37 0.95 1.57 1.07 2.98 7.04 23.45 142.55 2885.28 1182072.38 
Uruguay 0.11 0.92 0.97 2.58 1.02 1.11 1.23 1.45 1.90 3.27 
Venezuela 0.04 0.98 1.00 1.01 1.03 1.07 1.13 1.22 1.39 1.80 
Zambia 0.26 1.04 1.59 1.03 2.74 5.66 15.58 71.28 898.29 142671.26 
Zimbabwe 0.06 1.11 1.37 2.43 1.78 2.55 4.20 8.87 30.86 373.70 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
